naa a22 4500 510784186 CHVBK 20180411083256.0 cr unu---uuuuu 180411e20130601xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s13164-013-0133-8 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s13164-013-0133-8 The Effect of What We Think may Happen on our Judgments of Responsibility [Elektronische Daten] [Felipe De Brigard, William Brady] Recent evidence suggests that if a deterministic description of the events leading up to a morally questionable action is couched in mechanistic, reductionistic, concrete and/or emotionally salient terms, people are more inclined toward compatibilism than when those descriptions use non-mechanistic, non-reductionistic, abstract and/or emotionally neutral terms. To explain these results, it has been suggested that descriptions of the first kind are processed by a concrete cognitive system, while those of the second kind are processed by an abstract cognitive system. The current paper reports the results of three studies exploring whether or not considerations about possible future consequences of holding an agent responsible at a present time affect people's judgments of responsibility. The results obtained suggest first that the concrete system does not produce compatibilist judgments of responsibility unconditionally, even when facing appropriately mechanistic, reductionistic, emotionally loaded and concretely worded deterministic scenarios. Second, these results suggest that considerations about possible future consequences for innocent third parties that may follow as a result of holding an agent responsible affect people's judgment as to whether or not the agent is responsible for what she did. Finally, it is proposed that these results compliment extant evidence on the so-called "Side-effect effect”, as they suggest that emotional reactions toward possible future side effects influence people's judgment of responsibility. The impact of these results for philosophy and moral psychology is discussed. Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht, 2013 De Brigard Felipe Department of Psychology, Harvard University, 860 William James Hall 33 Kirkland St., 02139, Cambridge, MA, USA aut Brady William Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY, USA aut Review of Philosophy and Psychology Springer Netherlands 4/2(2013-06-01), 259-269 1878-5158 4:2<259 2013 4 13164 https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-013-0133-8 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-013-0133-8 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- De Brigard Felipe Department of Psychology, Harvard University, 860 William James Hall 33 Kirkland St., 02139, Cambridge, MA, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Brady William Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Review of Philosophy and Psychology Springer Netherlands 4/2(2013-06-01), 259-269 1878-5158 4:2<259 2013 4 13164 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer