naa a22 4500 510789323 CHVBK 20180411083313.0 cr unu---uuuuu 180411e20131201xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s11406-013-9465-y doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s11406-013-9465-y Two Potential Problems with Philosophical Intuitions: Muddled Intuitions and Biased Intuitions [Elektronische Daten] [Jeanine Schroer, Robert Schroer] One critique of experimental philosophy is that the intuitions of the philosophically untutored should be accorded little to no weight; instead, only the intuitions of professional philosophers should matter. In response to this critique, "experimentalists” often claim that the intuitions of professional philosophers are biased. In this paper, we explore this question of whose intuitions should be disqualified and why. Much of the literature on this issue focuses on the question of whether the intuitions of professional philosophers are reliable. In contrast, we instead focus on the idea of "muddled” intuitions—i.e. intuitions that are misdirected and about notions other than the ones under discussion. We argue that the philosophically untutored are likely to have muddled intuitions and that professional philosophers are likely to have unmuddled intuitions. Although being umuddled does not, by itself, establish the reliability of the intuitions of professional philosophers, being muddled is enough to disqualify the intuitions of the philosophically untutored. We then turn to the charge that, despite being unmuddled, professional philosophers still have biased intuitions. To evaluate this charge, we switch focus from the general notion of biased intuition to the more specific notion of theory-laden intuition. We argue that there is prima facie evidence—in the form of the presence of conflicts of intuition—for thinking that at least some of the intuitions of professional philosophers are theory-laden. In summary, we conclude that that there is no clean and easy answer to the question of whose intuitions should matter. Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht, 2013 Experimental philosophy nationallicence Expertise nationallicence Intuitions nationallicence Schroer Jeanine Department of Philosophy, University of Minnesota at Duluth, Duluth, MN, USA aut Schroer Robert Department of Philosophy, University of Minnesota at Duluth, Duluth, MN, USA aut Philosophia Springer Netherlands 41/4(2013-12-01), 1263-1281 0048-3893 41:4<1263 2013 41 11406 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-013-9465-y text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-013-9465-y text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Schroer Jeanine Department of Philosophy, University of Minnesota at Duluth, Duluth, MN, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Schroer Robert Department of Philosophy, University of Minnesota at Duluth, Duluth, MN, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Philosophia Springer Netherlands 41/4(2013-12-01), 1263-1281 0048-3893 41:4<1263 2013 41 11406 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer