naa a22 4500 510789382 CHVBK 20180411083313.0 cr unu---uuuuu 180411e20131201xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s11406-013-9427-4 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s11406-013-9427-4 Boult Cameron School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK aut Epistemic Principles and Sceptical Arguments: Closure and Underdetermination [Elektronische Daten] [Cameron Boult] Anthony Brueckner has argued that claims about underdetermination of evidence are suppressed in closure-based scepticism ("The Structure of the Skeptical Argument”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54:4, 1994). He also argues that these claims about underdetermination themselves lead to a paradoxical sceptical argument—the underdetermination argument—which is more fundamental than the closure argument. If Brueckner is right, the status quo focus of some predominant anti-sceptical strategies may be misguided. In this paper I focus specifically on the relationship between these two arguments. I provide support for Brueckner's claim that the underdetermination argument is the more fundamental sceptical argument. I do so by responding to a challenge to this claim put forward by Stewart Cohen ("Two Kinds of Skeptical Argument”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58:1, 1998). Cohen invokes an alternative epistemic principle which he thinks can be used to challenge Brueckner. Cohen's principle raises interesting questions about the relationship between evidential considerations and explanatory considerations in the context of scepticism about our knowledge of the external world. I explore these questions in my defence of Brueckner. Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht, 2013 Scepticism nationallicence Closure nationallicence Underdetermination nationallicence Evidence nationallicence Explanation nationallicence Paradox nationallicence Philosophia Springer Netherlands 41/4(2013-12-01), 1125-1133 0048-3893 41:4<1125 2013 41 11406 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-013-9427-4 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-013-9427-4 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Boult Cameron School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Philosophia Springer Netherlands 41/4(2013-12-01), 1125-1133 0048-3893 41:4<1125 2013 41 11406 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer