naa a22 4500 510789420 CHVBK 20180411083314.0 cr unu---uuuuu 180411e20131201xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s11406-013-9454-1 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s11406-013-9454-1 Orsi Francesco Philosophy Department, University of Tartu, Jakobi 2, 51014, Tartu, Estonia aut How to Be a Friend of Absolute Goodness [Elektronische Daten] [Francesco Orsi] This paper critically examines Richard Kraut's attack on the notion of absolute value, and lays out some of the conceptual work required to defend such a notion. The view under attack claims that absolute goodness is a property that provides a reason to value what has it. Kraut's overall challenge is that absolute goodness cannot play this role. Kraut's own view is that goodness-for, instead, plays the reason-providing role. My targets are Kraut's double-counting objection, and his ethical objection against absolute value. After explaining the double-counting objection, and discussing the idea of non-additive reasons, I examine and reject Kraut's reasons for holding that nonadditivity can rescue relative value but not absolute value. I proceed then to explore a different reply to the double-counting objection by introducing a distinction between normative reasons for action and reasons that explain why a certain consideration is a reason for action. Such a distinction (hinted at by Kraut) would either help both Kraut and the friend of absolute value, or neither of them. I defend the distinction from the objection that it would make absolute value just a ‘shadow'. Finally, I reply to Kraut's ethical objection that being motivated by absolute value is depersonalizing, on two grounds: 1) if thinking in terms of absolute value depersonalizes relationships, then we have absolute-value-given reasons not to think in those terms; 2) the distinction between normative and explanatory reasons explains why even a motivation centred on absolute value need not be depersonalizing. Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht, 2013 Absolute goodness nationallicence Buck-passing nationallicence Good for nationallicence Non-additivity nationallicence Moore nationallicence Philosophia Springer Netherlands 41/4(2013-12-01), 1237-1251 0048-3893 41:4<1237 2013 41 11406 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-013-9454-1 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-013-9454-1 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Orsi Francesco Philosophy Department, University of Tartu, Jakobi 2, 51014, Tartu, Estonia aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Philosophia Springer Netherlands 41/4(2013-12-01), 1237-1251 0048-3893 41:4<1237 2013 41 11406 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer