naa a22 4500 510789447 CHVBK 20180411083314.0 cr unu---uuuuu 180411e20131201xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s11406-013-9425-6 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s11406-013-9425-6 Lee Byeong Department of Philosophy, Sungkyunkwan University, Seoul, Republic of Korea aut Fales's Defense of the Given and Requirements for Being a Reason [Elektronische Daten] [Byeong Lee] Fales defends the doctrine of the given against the Sellarsian dilemma. On his view, sensory experiences, to which one has direct access, can justify basic beliefs. He upholds this view by way of defending an expansive conception of inference, according to which a broadly inferential relation can hold between sensory experiences and perceptual beliefs. The purpose of this paper is to show that Fales's defense of the given fails. For this purpose, I argue that there are two requirements for being a good reason, and that his conception of direct apprehension faces a serious dilemma with regard to these requirements. In addition, I argue that his expansive conception of inference is unfounded. Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht, 2013 The Sellarsian dilemma nationallicence Fales nationallicence Direct apprehension nationallicence An expansive conception of inference nationallicence Requirements for being a reason nationallicence Philosophia Springer Netherlands 41/4(2013-12-01), 1217-1235 0048-3893 41:4<1217 2013 41 11406 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-013-9425-6 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-013-9425-6 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Lee Byeong Department of Philosophy, Sungkyunkwan University, Seoul, Republic of Korea aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Philosophia Springer Netherlands 41/4(2013-12-01), 1217-1235 0048-3893 41:4<1217 2013 41 11406 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer