naa a22 4500 510789455 CHVBK 20180411083314.0 cr unu---uuuuu 180411e20131201xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s11406-013-9463-0 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s11406-013-9463-0 Daniels Paul Philosophy Department; School of Philosophical, Historical, and International Studies, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia aut Endurantism and Paradox [Elektronische Daten] [Paul Daniels] Mereological challenges have recently been raised against the endurantist. For instance, Barker and Dowe (2003) have argued that eternalist endurantism entails (1) persisting objects are both 3D and 4D, and that (2) the lives of persisting objects last longer than they actually do. They also argue that presentist endurantism also entails, albeit in a tensed way, that (3) the lives of persisting objects last longer than they actually do. While they've further argued (2005) that the objections raised by McDaniel (2003) and Beebee and Rush (2003) fail, here I show that such objections are tenable without requiring further significant metaphysical commitments; I argue that such endurantist defences are tenable, contra to prior analyses. Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht, 2013 Endurantism nationallicence Multi-location nationallicence Mereology nationallicence Eternalism nationallicence Presentism nationallicence Philosophia Springer Netherlands 41/4(2013-12-01), 1173-1179 0048-3893 41:4<1173 2013 41 11406 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-013-9463-0 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-013-9463-0 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Daniels Paul Philosophy Department; School of Philosophical, Historical, and International Studies, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Philosophia Springer Netherlands 41/4(2013-12-01), 1173-1179 0048-3893 41:4<1173 2013 41 11406 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer