naa a22 4500 510789757 CHVBK 20180411083315.0 cr unu---uuuuu 180411e20130601xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s11406-012-9393-2 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s11406-012-9393-2 MacKay Douglas Department of Bioethics, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, MD, USA aut Incentive Inequalities and Talents: A Reply to Shiffrin [Elektronische Daten] [Douglas MacKay] In a recent article, Seana Valentine Shiffrin offers a distinctive egalitarian critique of the types of incentive inequalities that are permitted by John Rawls's difference principle. She argues that citizens of a well-ordered society, who publicly accept Rawls's two principles of justice and their justifications, may not demand incentives to employ their talents in productive ways since such demands are inconsistent with a major justification for the difference principle: the moral arbitrariness of talent. I argue that there is no such inconsistency. Citizens can publicly accept the claim that talent is morally arbitrary and accept incentives to employ their talents productively without inconsistency. In the standard case that Rawls envisions, citizens who do so take their preferences to be a reason for a higher salary, not their talents. Springer Science+Business Media B.V., 2012 John Rawls nationallicence Difference principle nationallicence Incentive inequalities nationallicence Talent nationallicence Philosophia Springer Netherlands 41/2(2013-06-01), 521-526 0048-3893 41:2<521 2013 41 11406 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-012-9393-2 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-012-9393-2 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- MacKay Douglas Department of Bioethics, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, MD, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Philosophia Springer Netherlands 41/2(2013-06-01), 521-526 0048-3893 41:2<521 2013 41 11406 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer