naa a22 4500 510791484 CHVBK 20180411083321.0 cr unu---uuuuu 180411e20130701xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s11277-012-0816-y doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s11277-012-0816-y Fair and Efficient Spectrum Splitting for Unlicensed Secondary Users in Cooperative Cognitive Radio Networks [Elektronische Daten] [Guopeng Zhang, Kun Yang, Jinling Song, Yanwei Li] In cooperative cognitive radio networks (CCRNs), a licensed primary-user (PU) is allowed to leverage several unlicensed secondary-users (SUs) to relay its traffic. In this paper, a staged dynamic spectrum allocation (DSA) scheme is proposed for CCRNs. In the first stage, the network is uncongested. A simple pricing based DSA scheme is proposed for the PUs to lease their idled frequency bands to the SUs. And, hence, the initial quality of service (QoS) demands (in terms of the minimum rate requirements) of the PUs and the SUs are both satisfied through direct transmission on the allocated frequency bands. In the second stage, the network reaches the full-loaded situation. Therefore, a cooperative relaying based DSA scheme is proposed to stimulate the PUs to split more extra frequency bands to fulfill the increased QoS demands of the SUs, on condition that the QoS of the PUs are well maintained. By applying the cooperative bargaining game theory in the proposed cooperative relaying based DSA, on the one hand, the SUs can get fairness rate-rewards from the PUs according to the level of contribution that they can make to compensate the PUs for the rate-losses. Hence, the increased QoS demands of the SUs can be accommodated in short term. On the other hand, the PUs could retain the SUs successfully to obtain the long-term revenue, on condition that their QoS constraints are still satisfied. Finally, the analysis results of the proposed bargaining game theoretic DSA scheme (in the second stage) are testified through computer simulations. Springer Science+Business Media, LLC., 2012 Cognitive radio nationallicence Dynamic spectrum allocation nationallicence Coopeative relaying nationallicence Bargaining game theory nationallicence Nash bargaining solution nationallicence Zhang Guopeng The Internet of Things Research Center, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou, China aut Yang Kun The School of Computer Science and Electronic Engineering, University of Essex, Colchester, UK aut Song Jinling The Internet of Things Research Center, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou, China aut Li Yanwei The Graduate School of Global Information and Telecommunication Study, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan aut Wireless Personal Communications Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 71/1(2013-07-01), 299-316 0929-6212 71:1<299 2013 71 11277 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11277-012-0816-y text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11277-012-0816-y text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Zhang Guopeng The Internet of Things Research Center, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou, China aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Yang Kun The School of Computer Science and Electronic Engineering, University of Essex, Colchester, UK aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Song Jinling The Internet of Things Research Center, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou, China aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Li Yanwei The Graduate School of Global Information and Telecommunication Study, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Wireless Personal Communications Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 71/1(2013-07-01), 299-316 0929-6212 71:1<299 2013 71 11277 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer