naa a22 4500 528782312 20180924065513.0 cr unu---uuuuu 180924e20120216xx s 000 0 eng 10.3929/ethz-b-000048491 doi 10.1371/journal.pone.0030902 doi (ETHRESEARCH)oai:www.research-collection.ethz.ch:20.500.11850/48491 Chadefaux Thomas The Rationality of Prejudices [Elektronische Daten] [Thomas Chadefaux, Dirk Helbing] PLoS ONE Open access ethresearch We model an -player repeated prisoner's dilemma in which players are given traits (e.g., height, age, wealth) which, we assume, affect their behavior. The relationship between traits and behavior is unknown to other players. We then analyze the performance of "prejudiced” strategies—strategies that draw inferences based on the observation of some or all of these traits, and extrapolate the inferred behavior to other carriers of these traits. Such prejudiced strategies have the advantage of learning rapidly, and hence of being well adapted to rapidly changing conditions that might result, for example, from high migration or birth rates. We find that they perform remarkably well, and even systematically outperform both Tit-For-Tat and ALLD when the population changes rapidly. Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0 ethresearch Helbing Dirk joint author PLoS ONE S.l. : Public Library of Science 7 (2), p. e30902 1932-6203 http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/48491 text/html WWW-Backlink auf das Repository (Open access) 1 Journal Article ethresearch ETHRESEARCH 856 40 http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/48491 text/html WWW-Backlink auf das Repository (Open access) ETHRESEARCH 100 1- Chadefaux Thomas ETHRESEARCH 700 1- Helbing Dirk joint author ETHRESEARCH 773 0- PLoS ONE S.l. : Public Library of Science 7 (2), p. e30902 1932-6203 BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 ETHRESEARCH ETHRESEARCH ETHRESEARCH Journal Article Open access