naa a22 4500 528785176 20180924065518.0 cr unu---uuuuu 180924e20131004xx s 000 0 eng 10.3929/ethz-b-000073606 doi 10.1371/journal.pone.0076063 doi (ETHRESEARCH)oai:www.research-collection.ethz.ch:20.500.11850/73606 Perc Matjaž Understanding Recurrent Crime as System-Immanent Collective Behavior [Elektronische Daten] [Matjaž Perc, Karsten Donnay, Dirk Helbing] PLoS ONE Open access ethresearch Containing the spreading of crime is a major challenge for society. Yet, since thousands of years, no effective strategy has been found to overcome crime. To the contrary, empirical evidence shows that crime is recurrent, a fact that is not captured well by rational choice theories of crime. According to these, strong enough punishment should prevent crime from happening. To gain a better understanding of the relationship between crime and punishment, we consider that the latter requires prior discovery of illicit behavior and study a spatial version of the inspection game. Simulations reveal the spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance between "criminals”, "inspectors”, and "ordinary people” as a consequence of spatial interactions. Such cycles dominate the evolutionary process, in particular when the temptation to commit crime or the cost of inspection are low or moderate. Yet, there are also critical parameter values beyond which cycles cease to exist and the population is dominated either by a stable mixture of criminals and inspectors or one of these two strategies alone. Both continuous and discontinuous phase transitions to different final states are possible, indicating that successful strategies to contain crime can be very much counter-intuitive and complex. Our results demonstrate that spatial interactions are crucial for the evolutionary outcome of the inspection game, and they also reveal why criminal behavior is likely to be recurrent rather than evolving towards an equilibrium with monotonous parameter dependencies. Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0 ethresearch Donnay Karsten joint author Helbing Dirk joint author PLoS ONE San Francisco, CA, USA : Public Library of Science 8 (10), p. e76063 1932-6203 http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/73606 text/html WWW-Backlink auf das Repository (Open access) 1 Journal Article ethresearch ETHRESEARCH 856 40 http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/73606 text/html WWW-Backlink auf das Repository (Open access) ETHRESEARCH 100 1- Perc Matjaž ETHRESEARCH 700 1- Donnay Karsten joint author ETHRESEARCH 700 1- Helbing Dirk joint author ETHRESEARCH 773 0- PLoS ONE San Francisco, CA, USA : Public Library of Science 8 (10), p. e76063 1932-6203 BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 ETHRESEARCH ETHRESEARCH ETHRESEARCH Journal Article Open access