<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim">
 <record>
  <leader>     caa a22        4500</leader>
  <controlfield tag="001">530098377</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="005">20181217030326.0</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="007">cr unu---uuuuu</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="008">181026e20160805xx      s     000 0 eng  </controlfield>
  <datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2="0">
   <subfield code="a">10.3929/ethz-b-000119515</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">doi</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2="0">
   <subfield code="a">10.1038/srep30845</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">doi</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">(ETHRESEARCH)oai:www.research-collection.ethz.ch:20.500.11850/119515</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="245" ind1="0" ind2="0">
   <subfield code="a">Detecting the Collapse of Cooperation in Evolving Networks</subfield>
   <subfield code="h">[Elektronische Daten]</subfield>
   <subfield code="c">[Matteo Cavaliere, Guoli Yang, Vincent Danos, Vasilis Dakos]</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="246" ind1="0" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Sci Rep</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="506" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Open access</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">ethresearch</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">The sustainability of biological, social, economic and ecological communities is often determined by the outcome of social conflicts between cooperative and selfish individuals (cheaters). Cheaters avoid the cost of contributing to the community and can occasionally spread in the population leading to the complete collapse of cooperation. Although such collapse often unfolds unexpectedly, it is unclear whether one can detect the risk of cheater's invasions and loss of cooperation in an evolving community. Here, we combine dynamical networks and evolutionary game theory to study the abrupt loss of cooperation with tools for studying critical transitions. We estimate the risk of cooperation collapse following the introduction of a single cheater under gradually changing conditions. We observe an increase in the average time it takes for cheaters to be eliminated from the community as the risk of collapse increases. We argue that such slow system response resembles slowing down in recovery rates prior to a critical transition. In addition, we show how changes in community structure reflect the risk of cooperation collapse. We find that these changes strongly depend on the mechanism that governs how cheaters evolve in the community. Our results highlight novel directions for detecting abrupt transitions in evolving networks.</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="540" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">ethresearch</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Evolution</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">ethresearch</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Evolutionary theory</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">ethresearch</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Cavaliere</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Matteo</subfield>
   <subfield code="e">joint author</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Yang</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Guoli</subfield>
   <subfield code="e">joint author</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Danos</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Vincent</subfield>
   <subfield code="e">joint author</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Dakos</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Vasilis</subfield>
   <subfield code="e">joint author</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="t">Scientific Reports</subfield>
   <subfield code="d">London : Nature Publishing Group</subfield>
   <subfield code="g">6, p. 30845</subfield>
   <subfield code="x">2045-2322</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0">
   <subfield code="u">http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/119515</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">text/html</subfield>
   <subfield code="z">WWW-Backlink auf das Repository (Open access)</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="908" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="D">1</subfield>
   <subfield code="a">Journal Article</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">ethresearch</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">ETHRESEARCH</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">856</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">40</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/119515</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">text/html</subfield>
   <subfield code="z">WWW-Backlink auf das Repository (Open access)</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">ETHRESEARCH</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">700</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">1-</subfield>
   <subfield code="a">Cavaliere</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Matteo</subfield>
   <subfield code="e">joint author</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">ETHRESEARCH</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">700</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">1-</subfield>
   <subfield code="a">Yang</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Guoli</subfield>
   <subfield code="e">joint author</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">ETHRESEARCH</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">700</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">1-</subfield>
   <subfield code="a">Danos</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Vincent</subfield>
   <subfield code="e">joint author</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">ETHRESEARCH</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">700</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">1-</subfield>
   <subfield code="a">Dakos</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Vasilis</subfield>
   <subfield code="e">joint author</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">ETHRESEARCH</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">773</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">0-</subfield>
   <subfield code="t">Scientific Reports</subfield>
   <subfield code="d">London : Nature Publishing Group</subfield>
   <subfield code="g">6, p. 30845</subfield>
   <subfield code="x">2045-2322</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="898" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">BK010053</subfield>
   <subfield code="b">XK010053</subfield>
   <subfield code="c">XK010000</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="949" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">ETHRESEARCH</subfield>
   <subfield code="F">ETHRESEARCH</subfield>
   <subfield code="b">ETHRESEARCH</subfield>
   <subfield code="j">Journal Article</subfield>
   <subfield code="c">Open access</subfield>
  </datafield>
 </record>
</collection>
