cam a22 4500 551359331 CHVBK 20201114033354.0 m d cr |n |||||||| 150605s2015 nyu sb 001 0 eng d 2014046055 978-0-19-025151-2 (hardback) (SERSOL)ssj0001499928 (WaSeSS)ssj0001499928 DLC eng DLC WaSeSS rda HJ2305 .D54 2015 336.2 23 PHI019000 POL010000 BUS064020 bisacsh Dietsch Peter Catching capital the ethics of tax competition Peter Dietsch New York, NY Oxford University Press [2015] 1 online resource (xiv, 264 pages) text txt rdacontent/eng computer c rdamedia/eng online resource cr rdacarrier/eng Includes bibliographical references (pages 225-240) and index. Machine generated contents note: -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- 1. The political philosophy of international taxation -- 2. A primer on taxation -- 3. What is at stake -- 4. Tax competition and the financial crisis -- 5. A short outline of the book -- PART I -- Chapter 1: Fiscal autonomy and tax competition -- 1. Framing the question as one of autonomy -- 2. Understanding tax competition...* -- 3. ... and its corrosive impact* -- 4. State incentives under tax competition -- 5. Conclusion -- Chapter 2: Regulating tax competition -- 1. Existing reform proposals and where they fall short -- 1.1. Capital controls -- 1.2. Unilateral measures to protect one's tax base -- 1.3. Redefining the corporate tax base -- 2. Two principles of global tax justice -- 2.1. The first principle: membership* -- 2.2. Transparency as a corollary of membership -- 2.3. The second principle: A constraint on the design of fiscal policy* -- 3. Implementation* -- 3.1. Institutionalizing the membership principle* -- 3.2. Institutionalizing the fiscal policy constraint* -- 3.3. Enforcement* -- 3.4. Comparison to the OECD and EU tax agendas and the question of feasibility* -- 4. Principles for global background justice* -- 5. Conclusion -- PART II -- Chapter 3: Efficiency of what? - Assessing efficiency arguments in the context of tax competition -- 1. The deadweight loss and its interpretation -- 2. Two concepts of efficiency -- 3. Efficiency as a placeholder -- 3.1. Efficiency as productive Pareto optimality -- 3.2. Efficiency as general Pareto optimality -- 3.3. Making sense of the models -- 3.4. Efficiency as economic growth -- 3.5. Taking stock -- 4. Efficiency as an optimal trade-off -- 5. Conclusion -- Chapter 4: Rethinking sovereignty in international fiscal policy -- 1. The many facets of sovereignty -- 2. Sovereignty with strings attached -- 3. Back to fiscal policy -- 4. The twofold conditional nature of sovereignty -- 5. What about non-democratic regimes? -- 6. Conclusion -- Chapter 5: Life with (or after) tax competition -- 1. Should the winners of tax competition compensate the losers? -- 1.1. What's the point of compensatory duties? -- 1.2. Calculating compensatory duties -- 2. Should low-income countries be allowed to compete on taxes? -- 3. Unwinding the system of tax havens -- 3.1. Additional duties towards low-income countries? -- 3.2. Corporate lobbies - the elephant in the room -- 4. Conclusion -- Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Index -- * These sections are largely based on Peter Dietsch & Thomas Rixen, "Tax Competition and Global Background Justice", The Journal of Political Philosophy 22/2 (2014), 150-77. I thank my co-author Thomas Rixen for his permission to use this material here. Lizenzbedingungen können den Zugang einschränken. License restrictions may limit access. "Rich people stash away trillions of dollars in tax havens like Switzerland, the Cayman Islands, or Singapore. Multinational corporations shift their profits to low-tax jurisdictions like Ireland or Panama to avoid paying tax. Recent stories in the media about Apple, Google, Starbucks, and Fiat are just the tip of the iceberg. There is hardly any multinational today that respects not just the letter but also the spirit of tax laws. All this becomes possible due to tax competition, with countries strategically designing fiscal policy to attract capital from abroad. The loopholes in national tax regimes that tax competition generates and exploits draw into question political economic life as we presently know it. They undermine the fiscal autonomy of political communities and contribute to rising inequalities in income and wealth. Building on a careful analysis of the ethical challenges raised by a world of tax competition, this book puts forward a normative and institutional framework to regulate the practice. In short, individuals and corporations should pay tax in the jurisdictions of which they are members, where this membership can come in degrees. Moreover, the strategic tax setting of states should be limited in important ways. An International Tax Organisation (ITO) should be created to enforce the principles of tax justice. The author defends this call for reform against two important objections. First, Dietsch refutes the suggestion that regulating tax competition is inefficient. Second, he argues that regulation of this sort, rather than representing a constraint on national sovereignty, in fact turns out to be a requirement of sovereignty in a global economy. The book closes with a series of reflections on the obligations that the beneficiaries of tax competition have towards the losers both prior to any institutional reform as well as in its aftermath"-- "Tax competition between states is what Peter Dietsch refers to in his title as "catching capital." In particular, he sees several forms of tax competition -- for portfolio capital, meaning holdings by wealthy private individuals; for the profits of multinational corporations; and for foreign direct investment, where actual economic activity is attracted. Peter Dietsch's book examines two central questions that stem from this situation. Is there anything ethically wrong about tax competition? And if there is, what should be done about it? Under the current system a lot of capital simply slips through the net; the loopholes caused by current tax competition mean that states do not capture the taxes they are entitled to. And as Thomas Piketty has argued, the vast increase in economic inequality stems in part from the ability of the rich to hide their wealth in this way. Given these moral issues, Dietsch argues that there is a pressing need for the global community to structure international fiscal policy to plug these loopholes. But how should it do so? Will the fiscal sovereignty of states be compromised? Can we regulate tax competition without being forced to harmonize all tax rates? How do we strike a balance between the autonomy of one state and the problems it creates for others? Should winners of tax competition compensate the losers? Finally, is regulating tax competition simply inefficient from an economic perspective? in answering these questions, Peter Dietsch advances and defends his own new global regulatory framework for tax competition"-- Taxation Taxation Moral and ethical aspects Tax incidence Fiscal policy Tax havens PHILOSOPHY / Political bisacsh POLITICAL SCIENCE / History & Theory bisacsh BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / International / Taxation bisacsh http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190251512.001.0001/acprof-9780190251512 Uni Basel: Volltext https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190251512.001.0001/acprof-9780190251512 Uni Bern: Volltext BK020053 XK020053 XK020000 Oxford Scholarship Online Philosophy Collection 2015-2016 E-Books von 360MarcUpdates Oxford Scholarship Online IDSBB A145 A145 145VT IDSBB B405 B405 405VT NELB4052004 IDSBB 100 1- Dietsch Peter IDSBB 856 40 http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190251512.001.0001/acprof-9780190251512 Uni Basel: Volltext IDSBB 856 40 https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190251512.001.0001/acprof-9780190251512 Uni Bern: Volltext SWISSBIB 353724661