cam a22 7 4500 55136775X CHVBK 20201114033801.0 m d cr |n |||||||| 151103s2016 enk sb 001 0 eng d 2015956477 978-0-19-875849-5 0-19-875849-9 (SERSOL)ssj0001742839 (WaSeSS)ssj0001742839 ERASA eng ERASA BDX YDXCP BTCTA OCLCQ OCLCO OCLCF SP1 CBY IBS WLU IAL JHE OCL UMS DLC WaSeSS rda BJ1461 .S44 2016 123/.5 23 Sehon Scott Robert 1963- author Free will and action explanation a non-causal, compatibilist account Scott Sehon Oxford, United Kingdom Oxford University Press 2016 1 online resource (xii, 239 pages) text txt rdacontent/eng computer c rdamedia/eng online resource cr rdacarrier/eng Includes bibliographical reference (pages [225]-233) and index. Acknowledgments. Introduction: what's at stake in the free will debate? Part 1 The teleological account of action : Teleology and interpretation -- Rationalizability and irrationality -- Other objections to the teleological account -- Rationalizing principles and causal explanation -- Deviant causal chains -- The commitments of common-sense psychology. Part 2 The teleological account of free will and responsibility : Application to free will: non-causal compatibilism -- Irrational actions and freedom -- Extraordinary cases -- How the teleological account undermines arguments for incompatibilism -- Epistemic problems for other accounts of free will -- Concluding thoughts. References -- Index. Lizenzbedingungen können den Zugang einschränken. License restrictions may limit access. Do we have free will and moral responsibility? Is free will compatible with determinism? Scott Sehon argues that we can make progress on these questions by focusing on an underlying issue: the nature of action explanation. Part I of the book proposes and defends a non-causal account of action and agency, according to which reason explanation of human behavior is irreducibly teleological rather than causal. Part II applies the teleological account of action to free will and responsibility, arguing that the free actions-the ones for which we are directly responsible. It is then argued that this non-causal account of action undermines the appeal of incompatibilist arguments, arguments attempting to show that free will is not compatible with determinism. Beyond this, Sehon argues that the non-causal compatibilist account works well in practice: it is in accord with our clear intuitions about cases, and it both explains and provides guidance in the cases where our intuitions are murkier. Free will and determinism Explanation Act (Philosophy) http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198758495.001.0001 Uni Basel: Volltext https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198758495.001.0001/acprof-9780198758495 Uni Bern: Volltext BK020053 XK020053 XK020000 Oxford Scholarship Online Philosophy Collection 2016-2017 E-Books von 360MarcUpdates Oxford Scholarship Online IDSBB A145 A145 145VT NELA1451802 IDSBB B405 B405 405VT NELB4052004 IDSBB 100 1- Sehon Scott Robert 1963- author IDSBB 856 40 http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198758495.001.0001 Uni Basel: Volltext IDSBB 856 40 https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198758495.001.0001/acprof-9780198758495 Uni Bern: Volltext SWISSBIB 404710115