cam a22 7 4500 551370955 CHVBK 20201114033941.0 m d cr |n |||||||| 141002s2015 enk sb 001 0 eng d 2014953017 GBB5-28093 bnb 978-0-19-871678-5 (hbk.) 0-19-871678-8 (hbk.) (SERSOL)ssj0001538330 (WaSeSS)ssj0001538330 NLE eng NLE OCLCO STF NYP JHE OCLCF FXR OCLCQ ERASA BTCTA BDX CDX YDXCP ZCU HTM CUY OCL TLE XII DLC WaSeSS rda B1489 .D415 2015 192 23 De Pierris Graciela Teresa author Ideas, evidence, and method Hume's skepticism and naturalism concerning knowledge and causation Graciela De Pierris Hume's skepticism and naturalism concerning knowledge and causation First edition. Oxford, United Kingdom New York, NY Oxford University Press 2015 1 online resource (xv, 318 pages) text txt rdacontent/eng computer c rdamedia/eng online resource cr rdacarrier/eng Includes bibliographical references and index. Lizenzbedingungen können den Zugang einschränken. License restrictions may limit access. Graciela De Pierris presents a novel interpretation of the relationship between skepticism and naturalism in Hume's epistemology, and a new appraisal of Hume's place within early modern thought. Whereas a dominant trend in recent Hume scholarship maintains that there are no skeptical arguments concerning causation and induction in Book I, Part III of the 'Treatise, ' Graciela De Pierris presents a detailed reading of the skeptical argument she finds there and how this argument initiates a train of skeptical reasoning that begins in Part III and culminates in Part IV. This reasoning is framed by Hume's version of the modern theory of ideas developed by Descartes and Locke. The skeptical implications of this theory, however, do not arise, as in traditional interpretations of Hume's skepticism, from the 'veil of perception.' They arise from Hume's elaboration of a presentational-phenomenological model of ultimate evidence, according to which there is always a justificatory gap between what is or has been immediately presented to the mind and any ideas that go beyond it. This happens, paradigmatically, in the causal-inductive inference, and, as De Pierris argues, in demonstrative inference as well. Yet, in spite of his firm commitment to radical skepticism, Hume also accepts the naturalistic standpoint of science and common life, and he does so, on the novel interpretation presented here, because of an equally firm commitment to Newtonian science in general and the Newtonian inductive method in particular. Hume defends the Newtonian method (against the mechanical philosophy) while simultaneously rejecting all attempts (including those of the Newtonians) to find a place for the supernatural within our understanding of nature. Hume, David 1711-1776 Treatise of human nature Treatise of human nature Hume, David fast (OCoLC)fst01356124 Skepticism Knowledge, Theory of Causation Knowledge, Theory of (OCoLC)fst00988194 fast Skepticism (OCoLC)fst01119940 fast Causation (OCoLC)fst00849829 fast http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716785.001.0001/acprof-9780198716785 Uni Basel: Volltext https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716785.001.0001/acprof-9780198716785 Uni Bern: Volltext BK020053 XK020053 XK020000 Oxford Scholarship Online Philosophy Collection 2015-2016 E-Books von 360MarcUpdates Oxford Scholarship Online IDSBB A145 A145 145VT IDSBB B405 B405 405VT NELB4052004 IDSBB 100 1- De Pierris Graciela Teresa author IDSBB 856 40 http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716785.001.0001/acprof-9780198716785 Uni Basel: Volltext IDSBB 856 40 https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716785.001.0001/acprof-9780198716785 Uni Bern: Volltext SWISSBIB 361155999