cam a22 7 4500 551384948 CHVBK 20201114034632.0 m d cr |n |||||||| 141103t20152015enk sb 001 0 eng d 2014955882 GBB5-28114 bnb 978-0-19-873260-0 (hbk.) 0-19-873260-0 (hbk.) (SERSOL)ssj0001573326 (WaSeSS)ssj0001573326 NLE eng NLE OCLCO BTCTA BDX YDXCP IDU STF LTSCA NHM LNT OCLCF IUL CHVBK OCLCQ S3O IAD OCLCO A7U IAK OCL Z5A DLC WaSeSS rda BJ1012 .P4545 2015 170 23 Pettit Philip 1945- author The robust demands of the good ethics with attachment, virtue, and respect Philip Pettit First edition. Oxford Oxford University Press 2015 ©2015 1 online resource (x, 281 pages) text txt rdacontent/eng computer c rdamedia/eng online resource cr rdacarrier/eng Uehiro series in practical ethics Includes bibliographical references (pages 263-272) and indexes. Preview -- The robust demands of attachment -- The robust demands of virtue -- The robust demands of respect -- The rationale of robust demands -- Doing good and being good -- Doing good and doing evil -- Doing good and doing right -- Overview -- Appendix I: Reconstructing attachment, virtue, and respect -- Appendix II: Robustness and probability -- Appendix III: Robust robustness. Lizenzbedingungen können den Zugang einschränken. License restrictions may limit access. "Some goods that we generate for others, as when we give them attention or help or encouragement, require us to provide that benefit under the actual circumstances where we interact. Other goods that we generate require not just that we actually provide that sort of benefit but that we are also poised to provide it, even should actual circumstances change in various ways. These goods demand robust and not merely actual beneficence. Thus to give you friendship I must be robustly, not just accidentally, attentive to your needs; to give you a virtue like honesty I must be robustly disposed to tell you the truth; and to give you respect I must be robustly committed to showing restraint in my dealings with you. In this original contribution to normative ethics, Philip Pettit charts the range of robustly demanding goods, building on his earlier work on the robust demands of freedom. He explores the rationale behind our concern for being able to rely on others to treat us well, not just for being lucky enough to enjoy good treatment. And then he traces the implications for ethics of giving a central place to robustly demanding goods. The lessons he draws teach us that there is a tighter connection between being good and doing good than is generally recognized; that it is harder to count as doing good than it is to count as doing evil; and that there is a serious issue, ignored in many ethical theories, about the basis on which we should deliberate in day-to-day decisions about what it is right to do. The book amounts to a radical rethinking of ethics in which many standard positions shift or fall. The association between being good and doing good casts doubt on the orthodox dichotomy between evaluating agents and evaluating actions. The calibration between doing good and doing evil explains the Knobe effect, so called, as well as explaining the superficial appeal of doctrines like that of double effect. And the investigation of how to be guided in deliberating about the right reduces the gap between the recommendations of approaches like Kantianism, contractualism, and virtue theory and their common, consequentialist foe."-- Ethics Normativity (Ethics) Metaphysics Philosophy of mind Moral realism Good and evil Virtue Respect Ethics (OCoLC)fst00915833 fast Good and evil (OCoLC)fst00944894 fast Metaphysics (OCoLC)fst01018304 fast Moral realism (OCoLC)fst01026092 fast Normativity (Ethics) (OCoLC)fst01039140 fast Philosophy of mind (OCoLC)fst01060840 fast Respect (OCoLC)fst01095688 fast Virtue (OCoLC)fst01167712 fast Angewandte Ethik gnd Normativ etik sao http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732600.001.0001/acprof-9780198732600 Uni Basel: Volltext https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732600.001.0001/acprof-9780198732600 Uni Bern: Volltext BK020053 XK020053 XK020000 Oxford Scholarship Online Philosophy Collection 2015-2016 E-Books von 360MarcUpdates Oxford Scholarship Online IDSBB A145 A145 145VT NELA1451707 IDSBB B405 B405 405VT NELB4052004 IDSBB 100 1- Pettit Philip 1945- author IDSBB 490 1- Uehiro series in practical ethics IDSBB 856 40 http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732600.001.0001/acprof-9780198732600 Uni Basel: Volltext IDSBB 856 40 https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732600.001.0001/acprof-9780198732600 Uni Bern: Volltext SWISSBIB 337025363