cam a22 4500 551393289 CHVBK 20201114035214.0 m d cr |n |||||||| 160623s2017 enka sb 001 0 eng d 2016945573 978-0-19-879339-7 (hardcover) (SERSOL)ssj0001812420 (WaSeSS)ssj0001812420 ERASA eng ERASA BDX YDXCP BTCTA NLE OCLCO YDX OCLCF INU OCLCA DLC WaSeSS rda JN30 .W57 2017 Winzen Thomas author Constitutional preferences and parliamentary reform explaining national parliaments' adaptation to European integration Thomas Winzen First edition. Oxford Oxford University Press [2017] 1 online resource (xii, 228 pages) illustrations text txt rdacontent/eng still image sti rdacontent/eng computer c rdamedia/eng online resource cr rdacarrier/eng Includes bibliographical references (pages 209-228) and index. Lizenzbedingungen können den Zugang einschränken. License restrictions may limit access. This book provides a comprehensive account of national parliaments' adaptation to European integration. Advancing an explanation based on political parties' constitutional preferences, the volume investigates the nature and variation of parliamentary rights in European Union affairs across countries and levels of governance. In some member states, parliaments have traditionally been strong and parties hold intergovernmental visions of European integration. In these countries, strong parliamentary rights emerge in the context of parties' efforts to realise their preferred constitutional design for the European polity. Parliamentary rights remain weakly developed where federally-oriented parties prevail, and where parliaments have long been marginal arenas in domestic politics. Moreover, divergent constitutional preferences underlie inter-parliamentary disagreement on national parliaments' collective rights at the European level. Constitutional preferences are key to understanding why a 'Senate' of national parliaments never enjoyed support and why the alternatives subsequently put into place have stayed clear of committing national parliaments to any common policies. This volume calls into question existing explanations that focus on strategic partisan incentives arising from minority and coalition government. Furthermoe, it rejects the exclusive attribution of parliamentary 'deficits' to the structural constraints created by European integration and, instead, restores a sense of accountability for parliamentary rights to political parties and their ideas for the European Union's constitutional design."-- European Union European Union (OCoLC)fst00916630 fast Cabinet system European Union countries Cabinet system (OCoLC)fst00843554 fast Politics and government (OCoLC)fst01919741 fast European Union countries Politics and government Europe European Union countries (OCoLC)fst01269470 fast https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198793397.001.0001/acprof-9780198793397 Uni Bern: Volltext BK020053 XK020053 XK020000 Oxford Scholarship Online Political Science Oxford Scholarship Online E-Books von 360MarcUpdates IDSBB B405 B405 405VT NELB4051707 IDSBB 100 1- Winzen Thomas author IDSBB 856 40 https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198793397.001.0001/acprof-9780198793397 Uni Bern: Volltext SWISSBIB 483102997