caa a22 4500 605448221 CHVBK 20210128100135.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20151101xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s10539-014-9473-8 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10539-014-9473-8 Shargel Daniel Philosophy Program, The Graduate Center, CUNY, 365 5th ave, 10016, New York, NY, USA aut Emotions without objects [Elektronische Daten] [Daniel Shargel] It is widely assumed that emotions have particular intentional objects. This assumption is consistent with the way that we talk: when we attribute states of anger, we often attribute anger at someone, or at something. It is also consistent with leading theories of emotion among philosophers and psychologists, according to which emotions are like judgments or appraisals. However, there is evidence from the social psychology literature suggesting that this assumption is actually false. I will begin by presenting a criterion for determining whether a mental state has a particular object. It is not sufficient for that state to be caused by an object or by a representation of a given object—the state must influence the subject's thought and behavior in ways that are specific to that object. I will present evidence that emotions fail this test, and describe some of the reasons why we persistently attribute objects to our emotions. My view may seem untenable, because the literature on various aspects of emotional life such as normativity, linguistic expression, and behavioral influence consistently appeals to intentional objects. I will conclude by presenting a sketch of how I could address this concern. Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht, 2014 Emotions nationallicence Objects nationallicence Intentionality nationallicence Moods nationallicence Biology & Philosophy Springer Netherlands 30/6(2015-11-01), 831-844 0169-3867 30:6<831 2015 30 10539 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-014-9473-8 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-014-9473-8 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Shargel Daniel Philosophy Program, The Graduate Center, CUNY, 365 5th ave, 10016, New York, NY, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Biology & Philosophy Springer Netherlands 30/6(2015-11-01), 831-844 0169-3867 30:6<831 2015 30 10539