Calhoun's concurrent majority as a generality norm

Verfasser / Beitragende:
[Alexander Salter]
Ort, Verlag, Jahr:
2015
Enthalten in:
Constitutional Political Economy, 26/3(2015-09-01), 375-390
Format:
Artikel (online)
ID: 605454965
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024 7 0 |a 10.1007/s10602-014-9183-x  |2 doi 
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100 1 |a Salter  |D Alexander  |u Department of Economics, Berry College, 2277 Martha Berry Highway NW, 30149, Mount Berry, GA, USA  |4 aut 
245 1 0 |a Calhoun's concurrent majority as a generality norm  |h [Elektronische Daten]  |c [Alexander Salter] 
520 3 |a The purpose of this paper is to analyze the political philosophy of John C. Calhoun from the perspective of Virginia Political Economy. Specifically, this paper argues that Calhoun's theory of the concurrent majority offers a way of operationalizing the "generality norm” of Buchanan and Congleton Politics by principle, not interest: towards nondiscriminatory democracy. liberty fund, indianapolis, (2003 [1988]).The analysis of this doctrine, which holds that constitutional democracy can only be preserved from majoritarian absolutism if minority interests have the power to check the power of majority coalitions, is this paper's main purpose. The paper also discusses the most plausible way Calhoun's recommendations can be put into practice in the United States by drawing on insights from his Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States, in which he defends the social compact theory of the union and the benefits of federalism. 
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690 7 |a Calhoun  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Concurrent majority  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Constitutional political economy  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Federalism  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Generality norm  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Majoritarianism  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Social compact  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Unanimity  |2 nationallicence 
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950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 100  |E 1-  |a Salter  |D Alexander  |u Department of Economics, Berry College, 2277 Martha Berry Highway NW, 30149, Mount Berry, GA, USA  |4 aut 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 773  |E 0-  |t Constitutional Political Economy  |d Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com  |g 26/3(2015-09-01), 375-390  |x 1043-4062  |q 26:3<375  |1 2015  |2 26  |o 10602