Constitutional property rights protection and economic growth: evidence from the post-communist transition

Verfasser / Beitragende:
[Christian Bjørnskov]
Ort, Verlag, Jahr:
2015
Enthalten in:
Constitutional Political Economy, 26/3(2015-09-01), 247-280
Format:
Artikel (online)
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024 7 0 |a 10.1007/s10602-015-9189-z  |2 doi 
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100 1 |a Bjørnskov  |D Christian  |u Department of Economics and Business, Aarhus University, Fuglesangs Allé 4, 8210, Aarhus V, Denmark  |4 aut 
245 1 0 |a Constitutional property rights protection and economic growth: evidence from the post-communist transition  |h [Elektronische Daten]  |c [Christian Bjørnskov] 
520 3 |a This paper seeks to estimate the economic growth effect of constitutional provisions for property rights protection. It does so using the unique situation in formerly communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Caucasus where all but two introduced new constitutions after the fall of the Iron Curtain. The effects of implementing different constitutional provisions can therefore be observed in a group of countries with similar formal starting points. Estimates provide no evidence of positive effects and mainly point towards a negative conclusion: the introduction of constitutional protection of property rights is not associated with economic development in the long run, but tends to impose costs during a period of institutional transition and implementation proportional to the constitutional change. 
540 |a Springer Science+Business Media New York, 2015 
690 7 |a Property rights  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Economic growth  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Constitutional political economy  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Transition  |2 nationallicence 
773 0 |t Constitutional Political Economy  |d Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com  |g 26/3(2015-09-01), 247-280  |x 1043-4062  |q 26:3<247  |1 2015  |2 26  |o 10602 
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900 7 |a Metadata rights reserved  |b Springer special CC-BY-NC licence  |2 nationallicence 
908 |D 1  |a research-article  |2 jats 
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950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 100  |E 1-  |a Bjørnskov  |D Christian  |u Department of Economics and Business, Aarhus University, Fuglesangs Allé 4, 8210, Aarhus V, Denmark  |4 aut 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 773  |E 0-  |t Constitutional Political Economy  |d Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com  |g 26/3(2015-09-01), 247-280  |x 1043-4062  |q 26:3<247  |1 2015  |2 26  |o 10602