caa a22 4500 60545504X CHVBK 20210128100210.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20151201xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s10602-015-9197-z doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10602-015-9197-z Kogelmann Brian University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, USA aut Modeling the individual for constitutional choice [Elektronische Daten] [Brian Kogelmann] This paper is about the use of the homo economicus behavioral model in the constitutional political economy research program. The paper argues that all existing arguments in defense of the behavioral model fail. These arguments are: the symmetry argument, the enterprise argument, the increasing costs argument, and the crowding out argument. As a result, those working in the constitutional political economy tradition are not justified in employing homo economicus, at least not until a new argument successfully defending the behavioral model is provided. Springer Science+Business Media New York, 2015 Constitutional political economy nationallicence Constitutional choice nationallicence Homo economicus nationallicence Behavioral modeling nationallicence Rational choice nationallicence James M. Buchanan nationallicence Geoffrey Brennan nationallicence Constitutional Political Economy Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 26/4(2015-12-01), 455-474 1043-4062 26:4<455 2015 26 10602 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-015-9197-z text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-015-9197-z text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Kogelmann Brian University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Constitutional Political Economy Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 26/4(2015-12-01), 455-474 1043-4062 26:4<455 2015 26 10602