Is foreign aid a pure public good for donor country citizens?

Verfasser / Beitragende:
[Travis Wiseman, Andrew Young]
Ort, Verlag, Jahr:
2015
Enthalten in:
Constitutional Political Economy, 26/4(2015-12-01), 421-433
Format:
Artikel (online)
ID: 605455066
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024 7 0 |a 10.1007/s10602-015-9195-1  |2 doi 
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245 0 0 |a Is foreign aid a pure public good for donor country citizens?  |h [Elektronische Daten]  |c [Travis Wiseman, Andrew Young] 
520 3 |a If donor country citizens are altruistic, their support for foreign aid will be instrumental and the (perceived) effects of a donor's aid can be enjoyed non-rivalrously by citizens of all countries. Alternatively, donor country citizens may achieve a "warm-glow” from their own contributions to the poor, in which case "own” or "own country” level donations, rather than world donations are the relevant measure. If this is true then, all else equal, we expect smaller countries to have higher per capita aid provisions. This could account for why the small Nordic countries are more generous with foreign aid than a large country like the US. Based on a panel of 27 development assistance committee countries covering the 1985-2005 period. We provide evidence that in large part supports the latter representation of voter interests. 
540 |a Springer Science+Business Media New York, 2015 
690 7 |a Public economics  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Public goods  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Non-rivalrous goods  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Foreign aid  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Development assistance  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Expressive voting  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Warm-glow  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Median voter theory  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Impure altruism  |2 nationallicence 
700 1 |a Wiseman  |D Travis  |u Department of Finance and Economics, P.O. Box 9580, 39762, Mississippi State, MS, USA  |4 aut 
700 1 |a Young  |D Andrew  |u College of Business and Economics, West Virginia University, 1601 University Avenue, 26506, Morgantown, WV, USA  |4 aut 
773 0 |t Constitutional Political Economy  |d Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com  |g 26/4(2015-12-01), 421-433  |x 1043-4062  |q 26:4<421  |1 2015  |2 26  |o 10602 
856 4 0 |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-015-9195-1  |q text/html  |z Onlinezugriff via DOI 
898 |a BK010053  |b XK010053  |c XK010000 
900 7 |a Metadata rights reserved  |b Springer special CC-BY-NC licence  |2 nationallicence 
908 |D 1  |a research-article  |2 jats 
949 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |F NATIONALLICENCE  |b NL-springer 
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950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 700  |E 1-  |a Wiseman  |D Travis  |u Department of Finance and Economics, P.O. Box 9580, 39762, Mississippi State, MS, USA  |4 aut 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 700  |E 1-  |a Young  |D Andrew  |u College of Business and Economics, West Virginia University, 1601 University Avenue, 26506, Morgantown, WV, USA  |4 aut 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 773  |E 0-  |t Constitutional Political Economy  |d Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com  |g 26/4(2015-12-01), 421-433  |x 1043-4062  |q 26:4<421  |1 2015  |2 26  |o 10602