Is foreign aid a pure public good for donor country citizens?
Gespeichert in:
Verfasser / Beitragende:
[Travis Wiseman, Andrew Young]
Ort, Verlag, Jahr:
2015
Enthalten in:
Constitutional Political Economy, 26/4(2015-12-01), 421-433
Format:
Artikel (online)
Online Zugang:
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| 024 | 7 | 0 | |a 10.1007/s10602-015-9195-1 |2 doi |
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| 245 | 0 | 0 | |a Is foreign aid a pure public good for donor country citizens? |h [Elektronische Daten] |c [Travis Wiseman, Andrew Young] |
| 520 | 3 | |a If donor country citizens are altruistic, their support for foreign aid will be instrumental and the (perceived) effects of a donor's aid can be enjoyed non-rivalrously by citizens of all countries. Alternatively, donor country citizens may achieve a "warm-glow” from their own contributions to the poor, in which case "own” or "own country” level donations, rather than world donations are the relevant measure. If this is true then, all else equal, we expect smaller countries to have higher per capita aid provisions. This could account for why the small Nordic countries are more generous with foreign aid than a large country like the US. Based on a panel of 27 development assistance committee countries covering the 1985-2005 period. We provide evidence that in large part supports the latter representation of voter interests. | |
| 540 | |a Springer Science+Business Media New York, 2015 | ||
| 690 | 7 | |a Public economics |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Public goods |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Non-rivalrous goods |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Foreign aid |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Development assistance |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Expressive voting |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Warm-glow |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Median voter theory |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Impure altruism |2 nationallicence | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Wiseman |D Travis |u Department of Finance and Economics, P.O. Box 9580, 39762, Mississippi State, MS, USA |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Young |D Andrew |u College of Business and Economics, West Virginia University, 1601 University Avenue, 26506, Morgantown, WV, USA |4 aut | |
| 773 | 0 | |t Constitutional Political Economy |d Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com |g 26/4(2015-12-01), 421-433 |x 1043-4062 |q 26:4<421 |1 2015 |2 26 |o 10602 | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-015-9195-1 |q text/html |z Onlinezugriff via DOI |
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| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 856 |E 40 |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-015-9195-1 |q text/html |z Onlinezugriff via DOI | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 700 |E 1- |a Wiseman |D Travis |u Department of Finance and Economics, P.O. Box 9580, 39762, Mississippi State, MS, USA |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 700 |E 1- |a Young |D Andrew |u College of Business and Economics, West Virginia University, 1601 University Avenue, 26506, Morgantown, WV, USA |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 773 |E 0- |t Constitutional Political Economy |d Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com |g 26/4(2015-12-01), 421-433 |x 1043-4062 |q 26:4<421 |1 2015 |2 26 |o 10602 | ||