caa a22 4500 605455074 CHVBK 20210128100210.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20151201xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s10602-015-9196-0 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10602-015-9196-0 Endogenous voting weights for elected representatives and redistricting [Elektronische Daten] [Justin Svec, James Hamilton] This paper analyzes the merits of a novel method of eliminating the power of a gerrymanderer that involves an endogenous weighting system for elected representatives. This endogenous weighting system ties the voting weight of elected representatives in the legislature to the share of the voters who voted for that representative's party and to the share of representatives elected from that party. If the weights are set correctly, it can be shown in the simple voting model of Gilligan and Matsusaka (Public Choice 100:65-84, 1999) that redistricting has no influence on the policy passed by the legislature. In effect, the endogenous weighting system converts a single-member plurality political system into one with proportional representation. Springer Science+Business Media New York, 2015 Redistricting nationallicence Representative weights nationallicence Gerrymander nationallicence Svec Justin Department of Economics, College of the Holy Cross, Box 45A, 01610, Worcester, MA, USA aut Hamilton James College of the Holy Cross, Worcester, MA, USA aut Constitutional Political Economy Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 26/4(2015-12-01), 434-441 1043-4062 26:4<434 2015 26 10602 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-015-9196-0 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-015-9196-0 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Svec Justin Department of Economics, College of the Holy Cross, Box 45A, 01610, Worcester, MA, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Hamilton James College of the Holy Cross, Worcester, MA, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Constitutional Political Economy Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 26/4(2015-12-01), 434-441 1043-4062 26:4<434 2015 26 10602