caa a22 4500 605455082 CHVBK 20210128100210.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20150601xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s10602-014-9178-7 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10602-014-9178-7 Sorge Marco University of Göttingen and CSEF, Platz der Goettinger Sieben 3, 37073, Göttingen, Germany aut Lobbying (strategically appointed) bureaucrats [Elektronische Daten] [Marco Sorge] When are strategic appointments useful in curbing policy bias from ex-post negotiation between state agencies and special interest groups? Bertelli and Feldmann (J Public Adm Res Theory 17:19-38, 2007) provide an insightful analysis of the issue within a full information model of presidential appointments. This paper examines whether and how their findings extend to a world of policy uncertainty and asymmetric information, which rationalizes delegation in the first place. We establish that the occurrence of policy-relevant equilibrium lobbying crucially relies on interest groups' leverage over the appointment game between higher-level institutions. Remarkably, bureaucratic lobbying may prove highly non-neutral with separated powers even when a candidate agency is agreed upon. In some circumstances (e.g., recess appointments in the US), by contrast, strategic appointments fully offset interest group influence in either form of government (unified versus divided), a finding in line with the conventional theory of delegation. Springer Science+Business Media New York, 2014 Legislative delegation nationallicence Strategic appointments nationallicence Bureaucratic lobbying nationallicence Constitutional Political Economy Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 26/2(2015-06-01), 171-189 1043-4062 26:2<171 2015 26 10602 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-014-9178-7 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-014-9178-7 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Sorge Marco University of Göttingen and CSEF, Platz der Goettinger Sieben 3, 37073, Göttingen, Germany aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Constitutional Political Economy Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 26/2(2015-06-01), 171-189 1043-4062 26:2<171 2015 26 10602