The public choice of university organization: a stylized story of a constitutional reform
Gespeichert in:
Verfasser / Beitragende:
[Martin Paldam]
Ort, Verlag, Jahr:
2015
Enthalten in:
Constitutional Political Economy, 26/2(2015-06-01), 137-158
Format:
Artikel (online)
Online Zugang:
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| 024 | 7 | 0 | |a 10.1007/s10602-014-9177-8 |2 doi |
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| 100 | 1 | |a Paldam |D Martin |u Department of Economics and Business, Aarhus University, Fuglesangs Allé 4, Building 2632 (L), 8210, Århus V, Denmark |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 4 | |a The public choice of university organization: a stylized story of a constitutional reform |h [Elektronische Daten] |c [Martin Paldam] |
| 520 | 3 | |a The essay presents and explains a highly stylized story of the reactions of the structure of a university to a constitutional reform—in the university law—that radically changed the power structure from a bottom-up representative system to a top-down hierarchical system practically without checks and balances. It was meant as a more business-like system to increasing effectiveness. However, the result has been precisely the reverse. Both the (relative) size and the salaries of the bureaucracy have increased, while its effectiveness has fallen. The bureaucracy has grown particularly fast in the special service bureaus outside the normal structure and in the PR-department. It is shown that these outcomes correspond to the predictions of public choice theory, notably that of Niskanen's theory of bureaucracy. | |
| 540 | |a Springer Science+Business Media New York, 2014 | ||
| 690 | 7 | |a University reform |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Bureaucratic growth |2 nationallicence | |
| 773 | 0 | |t Constitutional Political Economy |d Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com |g 26/2(2015-06-01), 137-158 |x 1043-4062 |q 26:2<137 |1 2015 |2 26 |o 10602 | |
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| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 856 |E 40 |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-014-9177-8 |q text/html |z Onlinezugriff via DOI | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 100 |E 1- |a Paldam |D Martin |u Department of Economics and Business, Aarhus University, Fuglesangs Allé 4, Building 2632 (L), 8210, Århus V, Denmark |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 773 |E 0- |t Constitutional Political Economy |d Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com |g 26/2(2015-06-01), 137-158 |x 1043-4062 |q 26:2<137 |1 2015 |2 26 |o 10602 | ||