The public choice of university organization: a stylized story of a constitutional reform

Verfasser / Beitragende:
[Martin Paldam]
Ort, Verlag, Jahr:
2015
Enthalten in:
Constitutional Political Economy, 26/2(2015-06-01), 137-158
Format:
Artikel (online)
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100 1 |a Paldam  |D Martin  |u Department of Economics and Business, Aarhus University, Fuglesangs Allé 4, Building 2632 (L), 8210, Århus V, Denmark  |4 aut 
245 1 4 |a The public choice of university organization: a stylized story of a constitutional reform  |h [Elektronische Daten]  |c [Martin Paldam] 
520 3 |a The essay presents and explains a highly stylized story of the reactions of the structure of a university to a constitutional reform—in the university law—that radically changed the power structure from a bottom-up representative system to a top-down hierarchical system practically without checks and balances. It was meant as a more business-like system to increasing effectiveness. However, the result has been precisely the reverse. Both the (relative) size and the salaries of the bureaucracy have increased, while its effectiveness has fallen. The bureaucracy has grown particularly fast in the special service bureaus outside the normal structure and in the PR-department. It is shown that these outcomes correspond to the predictions of public choice theory, notably that of Niskanen's theory of bureaucracy. 
540 |a Springer Science+Business Media New York, 2014 
690 7 |a University reform  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Bureaucratic growth  |2 nationallicence 
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950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 100  |E 1-  |a Paldam  |D Martin  |u Department of Economics and Business, Aarhus University, Fuglesangs Allé 4, Building 2632 (L), 8210, Århus V, Denmark  |4 aut 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 773  |E 0-  |t Constitutional Political Economy  |d Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com  |g 26/2(2015-06-01), 137-158  |x 1043-4062  |q 26:2<137  |1 2015  |2 26  |o 10602