caa a22 4500 605475067 CHVBK 20210128100350.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20150301xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s10516-014-9255-6 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10516-014-9255-6 Velázquez-Quesada Fernando Grupo de Lógica, Lenguaje e Información, Facultad de Filosofía, Universidad de Sevilla, C/ Camilo José Cela S/N, 41018, Seville, Spain aut Reasoning Processes as Epistemic Dynamics [Elektronische Daten] [Fernando Velázquez-Quesada] This work proposes an understanding of deductive, default and abductive reasoning as different instances of the same phenomenon: epistemic dynamics. It discusses the main intuitions behind each one of these reasoning processes, and suggest how they can be understood as different epistemic actions that modify an agent's knowledge and/or beliefs in a different way, making formal the discussion with the use of the dynamic epistemic logic framework. The ideas in this paper put the studied processes under the same umbrella, thus highlighting their relationship and allowing a better understanding of how they interact together. Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht, 2014 Deductive reasoning nationallicence Default reasoning nationallicence Abductive reasoning nationallicence Philosophy of science nationallicence Epistemic logic nationallicence Dynamic epistemic logic nationallicence Knowledge nationallicence Beliefs nationallicence Axiomathes Springer Netherlands 25/1(2015-03-01), 41-60 1122-1151 25:1<41 2015 25 10516 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-014-9255-6 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-014-9255-6 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Velázquez-Quesada Fernando Grupo de Lógica, Lenguaje e Información, Facultad de Filosofía, Universidad de Sevilla, C/ Camilo José Cela S/N, 41018, Seville, Spain aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Axiomathes Springer Netherlands 25/1(2015-03-01), 41-60 1122-1151 25:1<41 2015 25 10516