Martingale properties of self-enforcing debt

Verfasser / Beitragende:
[Florin Bidian, Camelia Bejan]
Ort, Verlag, Jahr:
2015
Enthalten in:
Economic Theory, 60/1(2015-09-01), 35-57
Format:
Artikel (online)
ID: 605475407
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024 7 0 |a 10.1007/s00199-014-0832-0  |2 doi 
035 |a (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00199-014-0832-0 
245 0 0 |a Martingale properties of self-enforcing debt  |h [Elektronische Daten]  |c [Florin Bidian, Camelia Bejan] 
520 3 |a Not-too-tight debt limits are endogenous restrictions on debt that prevent agents from defaulting and opting for a specified continuation utility, while allowing for maximal credit expansion. For an agent facing some fixed prices for the Arrow securities, we prove that discounted not-too-tight debt limits must differ by a martingale. 
540 |a Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2014 
690 7 |a Endogenous debt limits  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Not-too-tight constraints  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Limited enforcement  |2 nationallicence 
700 1 |a Bidian  |D Florin  |u Robinson College of Business, Georgia State University, PO Box 4036, 30302-4036, Atlanta, GA, USA  |4 aut 
700 1 |a Bejan  |D Camelia  |u School of Business, University of Washington-Bothell, 18115 Campus Way NE, 98011, Bothell, WA, USA  |4 aut 
773 0 |t Economic Theory  |d Springer Berlin Heidelberg  |g 60/1(2015-09-01), 35-57  |x 0938-2259  |q 60:1<35  |1 2015  |2 60  |o 199 
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950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 700  |E 1-  |a Bidian  |D Florin  |u Robinson College of Business, Georgia State University, PO Box 4036, 30302-4036, Atlanta, GA, USA  |4 aut 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 700  |E 1-  |a Bejan  |D Camelia  |u School of Business, University of Washington-Bothell, 18115 Campus Way NE, 98011, Bothell, WA, USA  |4 aut 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 773  |E 0-  |t Economic Theory  |d Springer Berlin Heidelberg  |g 60/1(2015-09-01), 35-57  |x 0938-2259  |q 60:1<35  |1 2015  |2 60  |o 199