caa a22 4500 605475415 CHVBK 20210128100351.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20150901xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s00199-015-0895-6 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00199-015-0895-6 Moral hazard and sorting in a market for partnerships [Elektronische Daten] [Ayça Kaya, Galina Vereshchagina] We examine how equilibrium sorting patterns in a matching market for partnerships are impacted by the presence of bilateral moral hazard in a repeated production setting. We find that this impact depends on how the cost of moral hazard manifests itself—whether efficient effort is not feasible or desirable from the beginning, or whether inefficient effort is resorted to only as a punishment equilibrium. Which of these is the case depends on both the details of the technology and the contractual environment. In the former case, the presence of moral hazard moves the market away from positive sorting. In the latter case, whether moral hazard favors positive or negative sorting depends on how the power of incentives needed to implement effort varies with the observable types of the agents. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2015 Moral hazard nationallicence Partnerships nationallicence Assortative matching nationallicence Kaya Ayça University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL, USA aut Vereshchagina Galina Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA aut Economic Theory Springer Berlin Heidelberg 60/1(2015-09-01), 73-121 0938-2259 60:1<73 2015 60 199 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0895-6 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0895-6 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Kaya Ayça University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Vereshchagina Galina Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Economic Theory Springer Berlin Heidelberg 60/1(2015-09-01), 73-121 0938-2259 60:1<73 2015 60 199