Efficient outcomes in repeated games with limited monitoring
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| 024 | 7 | 0 | |a 10.1007/s00199-015-0893-8 |2 doi |
| 035 | |a (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00199-015-0893-8 | ||
| 245 | 0 | 0 | |a Efficient outcomes in repeated games with limited monitoring |h [Elektronische Daten] |c [Mihaela van der Schaar, Yuanzhang Xiao, William Zame] |
| 520 | 3 | |a The folk theorem for infinitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring implies that for a general class of games, nearly efficient payoffs can be supported in perfect public equilibrium (PPE), provided the monitoring structure is sufficiently rich and players are arbitrarily patient. This paper shows that for stage games in which actions of players interfere strongly with each other, exactly efficient payoffs can be supported in PPE even when the monitoring structure is not rich and players are not arbitrarily patient. The class of stage games we study abstracts many environments including resource sharing. | |
| 540 | |a Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2015 | ||
| 690 | 7 | |a Repeated games |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Imperfect public monitoring |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Perfect public equilibrium |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Efficient outcomes |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Repeated resource allocation |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Repeated partnership |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Repeated contest |2 nationallicence | |
| 700 | 1 | |a van der Schaar |D Mihaela |u Electrical Engineering Department, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA, USA |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Xiao |D Yuanzhang |u Electrical Engineering Department, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA, USA |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Zame |D William |u Department of Economics, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA, USA |4 aut | |
| 773 | 0 | |t Economic Theory |d Springer Berlin Heidelberg |g 60/1(2015-09-01), 1-34 |x 0938-2259 |q 60:1<1 |1 2015 |2 60 |o 199 | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0893-8 |q text/html |z Onlinezugriff via DOI |
| 898 | |a BK010053 |b XK010053 |c XK010000 | ||
| 900 | 7 | |a Metadata rights reserved |b Springer special CC-BY-NC licence |2 nationallicence | |
| 908 | |D 1 |a research-article |2 jats | ||
| 949 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |F NATIONALLICENCE |b NL-springer | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 856 |E 40 |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0893-8 |q text/html |z Onlinezugriff via DOI | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 700 |E 1- |a van der Schaar |D Mihaela |u Electrical Engineering Department, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA, USA |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 700 |E 1- |a Xiao |D Yuanzhang |u Electrical Engineering Department, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA, USA |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 700 |E 1- |a Zame |D William |u Department of Economics, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA, USA |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 773 |E 0- |t Economic Theory |d Springer Berlin Heidelberg |g 60/1(2015-09-01), 1-34 |x 0938-2259 |q 60:1<1 |1 2015 |2 60 |o 199 | ||