caa a22 4500 605475423 CHVBK 20210128100351.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20150901xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s00199-015-0893-8 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00199-015-0893-8 Efficient outcomes in repeated games with limited monitoring [Elektronische Daten] [Mihaela van der Schaar, Yuanzhang Xiao, William Zame] The folk theorem for infinitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring implies that for a general class of games, nearly efficient payoffs can be supported in perfect public equilibrium (PPE), provided the monitoring structure is sufficiently rich and players are arbitrarily patient. This paper shows that for stage games in which actions of players interfere strongly with each other, exactly efficient payoffs can be supported in PPE even when the monitoring structure is not rich and players are not arbitrarily patient. The class of stage games we study abstracts many environments including resource sharing. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2015 Repeated games nationallicence Imperfect public monitoring nationallicence Perfect public equilibrium nationallicence Efficient outcomes nationallicence Repeated resource allocation nationallicence Repeated partnership nationallicence Repeated contest nationallicence van der Schaar Mihaela Electrical Engineering Department, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA, USA aut Xiao Yuanzhang Electrical Engineering Department, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA, USA aut Zame William Department of Economics, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA, USA aut Economic Theory Springer Berlin Heidelberg 60/1(2015-09-01), 1-34 0938-2259 60:1<1 2015 60 199 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0893-8 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0893-8 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- van der Schaar Mihaela Electrical Engineering Department, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Xiao Yuanzhang Electrical Engineering Department, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Zame William Department of Economics, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Economic Theory Springer Berlin Heidelberg 60/1(2015-09-01), 1-34 0938-2259 60:1<1 2015 60 199