caa a22 4500 605475482 CHVBK 20210128100352.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20151101xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s00199-015-0892-9 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00199-015-0892-9 Bhowmik Anuj Economic Research Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, 203 Barackpore Trunk Road, 700108, Kolkata, India aut Core and coalitional fairness: the case of information sharing rules [Elektronische Daten] [Anuj Bhowmik] We investigate properties of core allocations in a pure exchange asymmetric information economy whose space of agents is modelled by a mixed market and commodity space is an ordered Banach space admitting an interior point in the positive cone. The information system in our framework is the one introduced by Allen (Econ Theory 29:465-487, 2006). It is shown that the main results in Grodal (Econometrica 40:581-583, 1972), Schmeidler (Econometrica 40:579-580, 1972) and Vind (Econometrica 40:585-586, 1972) can be established in our model. As a consequence of one of these results, the main result in Hervés-Beloso et al. (Econ Thoery 55:545-563, 2014) is obtained in our framework. Finally, we prove that core allocations are coalitionally fair and incentive compatible. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2015 Asymmetric information economy nationallicence Coalitional fairness nationallicence Core nationallicence Information sharing rule nationallicence Economic Theory Springer Berlin Heidelberg 60/3(2015-11-01), 461-494 0938-2259 60:3<461 2015 60 199 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0892-9 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0892-9 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Bhowmik Anuj Economic Research Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, 203 Barackpore Trunk Road, 700108, Kolkata, India aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Economic Theory Springer Berlin Heidelberg 60/3(2015-11-01), 461-494 0938-2259 60:3<461 2015 60 199