Efficiency may improve when defectors exist
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| 024 | 7 | 0 | |a 10.1007/s00199-015-0909-4 |2 doi |
| 035 | |a (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00199-015-0909-4 | ||
| 245 | 0 | 0 | |a Efficiency may improve when defectors exist |h [Elektronische Daten] |c [Takako Fujiwara-Greve, Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, Nobue Suzuki] |
| 520 | 3 | |a In repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, the C-trigger strategy played by all players is well known to achieve symmetric efficiency when players are sufficiently patient. By contrast, if players are free to quit a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma without information flow to new partners, cooperation from the outset of new partnerships cannot be a part of any symmetric equilibrium. Fujiwara-Greve and Okuno-Fujiwara (Rev Econ Stud 76:993-1021, 2009) showed that symmetric trust-building strategies can constitute an equilibrium for sufficiently long initial (D,D) (trust-building) periods. However, trust-building periods create social loss of payoffs, and there is a possibility that an asymmetric equilibrium with some players cooperating immediately, while others defect, may be more efficient. We show that there is a "fundamentally asymmetric” locally stable Nash equilibrium consisting of the most cooperative strategy (C-trigger with ending the partnership when betrayed) and the most noncooperative strategy, which plays D and ends the partnership immediately. When the deviation gain is relatively small, the fundamentally asymmetric equilibrium is neutrally stable against equilibrium entrants within trust-building strategies and is more efficient than any Nash equilibrium consisting of non-degenerate trust-building strategies. Our result indicates that behavioral diversity can be stable and beneficial for the society, even if players are free to escape from personalized punishments. | |
| 540 | |a Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2015 | ||
| 690 | 7 | |a Efficiency |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Diversity |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Voluntary separation |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Prisoner's Dilemma |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Endogenous partnerships |2 nationallicence | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Fujiwara-Greve |D Takako |u Department of Economics, Keio University, 2-15-45 Mita, 108-8345, Minatoku, Tokyo, Japan |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Okuno-Fujiwara |D Masahiro |u Department of Economics, Musashino University, 3-3-3 Ariake, Kotoku, 135-0063, Tokyo, Japan |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Suzuki |D Nobue |u Faculty of Economics, Komazawa University, 1-23-1 Komazawa, 154-8525, Setagayaku, Tokyo, Japan |4 aut | |
| 773 | 0 | |t Economic Theory |d Springer Berlin Heidelberg |g 60/3(2015-11-01), 423-460 |x 0938-2259 |q 60:3<423 |1 2015 |2 60 |o 199 | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0909-4 |q text/html |z Onlinezugriff via DOI |
| 898 | |a BK010053 |b XK010053 |c XK010000 | ||
| 900 | 7 | |a Metadata rights reserved |b Springer special CC-BY-NC licence |2 nationallicence | |
| 908 | |D 1 |a research-article |2 jats | ||
| 949 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |F NATIONALLICENCE |b NL-springer | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 856 |E 40 |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0909-4 |q text/html |z Onlinezugriff via DOI | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 700 |E 1- |a Fujiwara-Greve |D Takako |u Department of Economics, Keio University, 2-15-45 Mita, 108-8345, Minatoku, Tokyo, Japan |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 700 |E 1- |a Okuno-Fujiwara |D Masahiro |u Department of Economics, Musashino University, 3-3-3 Ariake, Kotoku, 135-0063, Tokyo, Japan |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 700 |E 1- |a Suzuki |D Nobue |u Faculty of Economics, Komazawa University, 1-23-1 Komazawa, 154-8525, Setagayaku, Tokyo, Japan |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 773 |E 0- |t Economic Theory |d Springer Berlin Heidelberg |g 60/3(2015-11-01), 423-460 |x 0938-2259 |q 60:3<423 |1 2015 |2 60 |o 199 | ||