caa a22 4500 605475563 CHVBK 20210128100352.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20151001xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s00199-015-0867-x doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00199-015-0867-x Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues [Elektronische Daten] [Effrosyni Diamantoudi, Inés Macho-Stadler, David Pérez-Castrillo, Licun Xue] We consider issue-externality games in which agents can cooperate on multiple issues and externalities are present both within and across issues, that is, the amount a coalition receives in one issue depends on how the players are organized on all the issues. Examples of such games are several firms competing in multiple markets, and countries negotiating both a trade agreement (through, e.g., WTO) and an environmental agreement (e.g., Kyoto Protocol). We propose a way to extend (Shapley) values for partition function games to issue-externality games. We characterize our proposal through axioms that extend the Shapley axioms to our more general environment. The solution concept that we propose can be applied to many interesting games, including inter-temporal situations where players meet sequentially. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2015 Externalities nationallicence Cooperative game theory nationallicence Shapley value nationallicence Linked issues nationallicence Diamantoudi Effrosyni CIREQ and Department of Economics, Concordia University, 1455 boul. de Maisonneuve Ouest, H3G 1M8, Montreal, QC, Canada aut Macho-Stadler Inés Dept. Economía e Hist. Económica, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, Barcelona GSE, Edificio B, 08193, Bellaterra, Barcelona, Spain aut Pérez-Castrillo David Dept. Economía e Hist. Económica, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, Barcelona GSE, Edificio B, 08193, Bellaterra, Barcelona, Spain aut Xue Licun CIREQ and Department of Economics, McGill University, 855 Sherbrooke Street West, H3A 2T7, Montreal, QC, Canada aut Economic Theory Springer Berlin Heidelberg 60/2(2015-10-01), 315-343 0938-2259 60:2<315 2015 60 199 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0867-x text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0867-x text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Diamantoudi Effrosyni CIREQ and Department of Economics, Concordia University, 1455 boul. de Maisonneuve Ouest, H3G 1M8, Montreal, QC, Canada aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Macho-Stadler Inés Dept. Economía e Hist. Económica, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, Barcelona GSE, Edificio B, 08193, Bellaterra, Barcelona, Spain aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Pérez-Castrillo David Dept. Economía e Hist. Económica, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, Barcelona GSE, Edificio B, 08193, Bellaterra, Barcelona, Spain aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Xue Licun CIREQ and Department of Economics, McGill University, 855 Sherbrooke Street West, H3A 2T7, Montreal, QC, Canada aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Economic Theory Springer Berlin Heidelberg 60/2(2015-10-01), 315-343 0938-2259 60:2<315 2015 60 199