caa a22 4500 605475571 CHVBK 20210128100352.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20150101xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s00199-013-0778-7 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00199-013-0778-7 Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction [Elektronische Daten] [Helmuts Āzacis, Péter Vida] We study optimal bidder collusion in an independent private value first-price auction with two bidders and two possible valuations. There is a benevolent center that knows the bidders' valuations and sends private signals to the bidders in order to maximize their expected payoffs. After receiving their signals, bidders compete in a standard first-price auction, that is, without side payments or bid restrictions. We find that to improve on the bidders' payoffs, the signals must depend upon the valuations. If the bidders' signals are restricted to be non-correlated (depend only on the opponent's valuation), then the bidders' payoffs are strictly higher than the larger possible set of signals. If the signals are restricted to be perfectly correlated (public), only two possible signals are needed to achieve the highest bidder payoffs. However, these payoffs can be improved upon if the two signals are allowed to be imperfectly correlated. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2013 Bidder-optimal signal structure nationallicence Bid coordination mechanism nationallicence Collusion nationallicence (Bayes) correlated equilibrium nationallicence First-price auction nationallicence Public and private signals nationallicence Āzacis Helmuts Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University, Aberconway Building, Colum Drive, CF10 3EU, Cardiff, Wales, UK aut Vida Péter Department of Economics, University of Mannheim, L7, 3-5, 68131, Mannheim, Germany aut Economic Theory Springer Berlin Heidelberg 58/1(2015-01-01), 125-160 0938-2259 58:1<125 2015 58 199 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-013-0778-7 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-013-0778-7 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Āzacis Helmuts Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University, Aberconway Building, Colum Drive, CF10 3EU, Cardiff, Wales, UK aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Vida Péter Department of Economics, University of Mannheim, L7, 3-5, 68131, Mannheim, Germany aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Economic Theory Springer Berlin Heidelberg 58/1(2015-01-01), 125-160 0938-2259 58:1<125 2015 58 199