The Average Tree permission value for games with a permission tree
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| 024 | 7 | 0 | |a 10.1007/s00199-013-0796-5 |2 doi |
| 035 | |a (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00199-013-0796-5 | ||
| 245 | 0 | 4 | |a The Average Tree permission value for games with a permission tree |h [Elektronische Daten] |c [René van den Brink, P. Herings, Gerard van der Laan, A. Talman] |
| 520 | 3 | |a In the literature, various models of games with restricted cooperation can be found. In those models, instead of allowing for all subsets of the set of players to form, it is assumed that the set of feasible coalitions is a subset of the power set of the set of players. In this paper, we consider such sets of feasible coalitions that follow from a permission structure on the set of players, in which players need permission to cooperate with other players. We assume the permission structure to be an oriented tree. This means that there is one player at the top of the permission structure, and for every other player, there is a unique directed path from the top player to this player. We introduce a new solution for these games based on the idea of the Average Tree value for cycle-free communication graph games. We provide two axiomatizations for this new value and compare it with the conjunctive permission value. | |
| 540 | |a Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2014 | ||
| 690 | 7 | |a TU game |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Restricted cooperation |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Permission structure |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Shapley value |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Average Tree value |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Axiomatization |2 nationallicence | |
| 700 | 1 | |a van den Brink |D René |u Department of Econometrics, Tinbergen Institute, VU University, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081HV, Amsterdam, The Netherlands |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Herings |D P. |u Department of Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200MD, Maastricht, The Netherlands |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a van der Laan |D Gerard |u Department of Econometrics, Tinbergen Institute, VU University, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081HV, Amsterdam, The Netherlands |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Talman |D A. |u CentER, Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE, Tilburg, The Netherlands |4 aut | |
| 773 | 0 | |t Economic Theory |d Springer Berlin Heidelberg |g 58/1(2015-01-01), 99-123 |x 0938-2259 |q 58:1<99 |1 2015 |2 58 |o 199 | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-013-0796-5 |q text/html |z Onlinezugriff via DOI |
| 898 | |a BK010053 |b XK010053 |c XK010000 | ||
| 900 | 7 | |a Metadata rights reserved |b Springer special CC-BY-NC licence |2 nationallicence | |
| 908 | |D 1 |a research-article |2 jats | ||
| 949 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |F NATIONALLICENCE |b NL-springer | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 856 |E 40 |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-013-0796-5 |q text/html |z Onlinezugriff via DOI | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 700 |E 1- |a van den Brink |D René |u Department of Econometrics, Tinbergen Institute, VU University, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081HV, Amsterdam, The Netherlands |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 700 |E 1- |a Herings |D P. |u Department of Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200MD, Maastricht, The Netherlands |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 700 |E 1- |a van der Laan |D Gerard |u Department of Econometrics, Tinbergen Institute, VU University, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081HV, Amsterdam, The Netherlands |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 700 |E 1- |a Talman |D A. |u CentER, Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE, Tilburg, The Netherlands |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 773 |E 0- |t Economic Theory |d Springer Berlin Heidelberg |g 58/1(2015-01-01), 99-123 |x 0938-2259 |q 58:1<99 |1 2015 |2 58 |o 199 | ||