caa a22 4500 605475628 CHVBK 20210128100352.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20150101xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s00199-013-0796-5 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00199-013-0796-5 The Average Tree permission value for games with a permission tree [Elektronische Daten] [René van den Brink, P. Herings, Gerard van der Laan, A. Talman] In the literature, various models of games with restricted cooperation can be found. In those models, instead of allowing for all subsets of the set of players to form, it is assumed that the set of feasible coalitions is a subset of the power set of the set of players. In this paper, we consider such sets of feasible coalitions that follow from a permission structure on the set of players, in which players need permission to cooperate with other players. We assume the permission structure to be an oriented tree. This means that there is one player at the top of the permission structure, and for every other player, there is a unique directed path from the top player to this player. We introduce a new solution for these games based on the idea of the Average Tree value for cycle-free communication graph games. We provide two axiomatizations for this new value and compare it with the conjunctive permission value. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2014 TU game nationallicence Restricted cooperation nationallicence Permission structure nationallicence Shapley value nationallicence Average Tree value nationallicence Axiomatization nationallicence van den Brink René Department of Econometrics, Tinbergen Institute, VU University, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081HV, Amsterdam, The Netherlands aut Herings P. Department of Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200MD, Maastricht, The Netherlands aut van der Laan Gerard Department of Econometrics, Tinbergen Institute, VU University, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081HV, Amsterdam, The Netherlands aut Talman A. CentER, Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE, Tilburg, The Netherlands aut Economic Theory Springer Berlin Heidelberg 58/1(2015-01-01), 99-123 0938-2259 58:1<99 2015 58 199 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-013-0796-5 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-013-0796-5 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- van den Brink René Department of Econometrics, Tinbergen Institute, VU University, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081HV, Amsterdam, The Netherlands aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Herings P. Department of Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200MD, Maastricht, The Netherlands aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- van der Laan Gerard Department of Econometrics, Tinbergen Institute, VU University, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081HV, Amsterdam, The Netherlands aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Talman A. CentER, Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE, Tilburg, The Netherlands aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Economic Theory Springer Berlin Heidelberg 58/1(2015-01-01), 99-123 0938-2259 58:1<99 2015 58 199