<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim">
 <record>
  <leader>     caa a22        4500</leader>
  <controlfield tag="001">605475636</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="003">CHVBK</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="005">20210128100352.0</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="007">cr unu---uuuuu</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="008">210128e20150101xx      s     000 0 eng  </controlfield>
  <datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2="0">
   <subfield code="a">10.1007/s00199-013-0795-6</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">doi</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">(NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00199-013-0795-6</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="245" ind1="0" ind2="0">
   <subfield code="a">Pure-strategy Nash equilibria in nonatomic games with infinite-dimensional action spaces</subfield>
   <subfield code="h">[Elektronische Daten]</subfield>
   <subfield code="c">[Xiang Sun, Yongchao Zhang]</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">This paper studies the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria for nonatomic games where players take actions in infinite-dimensional Banach spaces. For any infinite-dimensional Banach space, if the player space is modeled by the Lebesgue unit interval, we construct a nonatomic game which has no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. But if the player space is modeled by a saturated probability space, there is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in every nonatomic game. Finally, if every game with a fixed nonatomic player space and a fixed infinite-dimensional action space has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, the underlying player space must be saturated.</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="540" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2013</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Infinite-dimensional action space</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Nonatomic game</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Pure-strategy Nash equilibrium</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Saturated probability space</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Sun</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Xiang</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">Economics and Management School, Wuhan University, 430072, Wuhan, China</subfield>
   <subfield code="4">aut</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Zhang</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Yongchao</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">School of Economics, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, 777 Guoding Road, 200433, Shanghai, China</subfield>
   <subfield code="4">aut</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="t">Economic Theory</subfield>
   <subfield code="d">Springer Berlin Heidelberg</subfield>
   <subfield code="g">58/1(2015-01-01), 161-182</subfield>
   <subfield code="x">0938-2259</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">58:1&lt;161</subfield>
   <subfield code="1">2015</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">58</subfield>
   <subfield code="o">199</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0">
   <subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-013-0795-6</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">text/html</subfield>
   <subfield code="z">Onlinezugriff via DOI</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="898" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">BK010053</subfield>
   <subfield code="b">XK010053</subfield>
   <subfield code="c">XK010000</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="900" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Metadata rights reserved</subfield>
   <subfield code="b">Springer special CC-BY-NC licence</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="908" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="D">1</subfield>
   <subfield code="a">research-article</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">jats</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="949" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="F">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="b">NL-springer</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">856</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">40</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-013-0795-6</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">text/html</subfield>
   <subfield code="z">Onlinezugriff via DOI</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">700</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">1-</subfield>
   <subfield code="a">Sun</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Xiang</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">Economics and Management School, Wuhan University, 430072, Wuhan, China</subfield>
   <subfield code="4">aut</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">700</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">1-</subfield>
   <subfield code="a">Zhang</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Yongchao</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">School of Economics, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, 777 Guoding Road, 200433, Shanghai, China</subfield>
   <subfield code="4">aut</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">773</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">0-</subfield>
   <subfield code="t">Economic Theory</subfield>
   <subfield code="d">Springer Berlin Heidelberg</subfield>
   <subfield code="g">58/1(2015-01-01), 161-182</subfield>
   <subfield code="x">0938-2259</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">58:1&lt;161</subfield>
   <subfield code="1">2015</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">58</subfield>
   <subfield code="o">199</subfield>
  </datafield>
 </record>
</collection>
