<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim">
 <record>
  <leader>     caa a22        4500</leader>
  <controlfield tag="001">605475644</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="003">CHVBK</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="005">20210128100352.0</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="007">cr unu---uuuuu</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="008">210128e20150401xx      s     000 0 eng  </controlfield>
  <datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2="0">
   <subfield code="a">10.1007/s00199-015-0865-z</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">doi</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">(NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00199-015-0865-z</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="245" ind1="0" ind2="0">
   <subfield code="a">Nash bargaining for log-convex problems</subfield>
   <subfield code="h">[Elektronische Daten]</subfield>
   <subfield code="c">[Cheng-Zhong Qin, Shuzhong Shi, Guofu Tan]</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">We introduce log-convexity for bargaining problems. With the requirement of some basic regularity conditions, log-convexity is shown to be necessary and sufficient for Nash's axioms to determine a unique single-valued bargaining solution up to choices of bargaining powers. Specifically, we show that the single-valued (asymmetric) Nash solution is the unique solution under Nash's axioms without that of symmetry on the class of regular and log-convex bargaining problems, but this is not true on any larger class. We apply our results to bargaining problems arising from duopoly and the theory of the firm. These problems turn out to be log-convex but not convex under familiar conditions. We compare the Nash solution for log-convex bargaining problems with some of its extensions in the literature.</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="540" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2015</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Bargaining problem</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Non-convexity</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Log-convexity</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Nash solution</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Nash product</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Qin</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Cheng-Zhong</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">Department of Economics, University of California, 93106, Santa Barbara, CA, USA</subfield>
   <subfield code="4">aut</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Shi</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Shuzhong</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">Guanghua School of Management, Peking University, Beijing, China</subfield>
   <subfield code="4">aut</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Tan</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Guofu</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">Department of Economics, University of Southern California, 90089-0253, Los Angeles, CA, USA</subfield>
   <subfield code="4">aut</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="t">Economic Theory</subfield>
   <subfield code="d">Springer Berlin Heidelberg</subfield>
   <subfield code="g">58/3(2015-04-01), 413-440</subfield>
   <subfield code="x">0938-2259</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">58:3&lt;413</subfield>
   <subfield code="1">2015</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">58</subfield>
   <subfield code="o">199</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0">
   <subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0865-z</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">text/html</subfield>
   <subfield code="z">Onlinezugriff via DOI</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="898" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">BK010053</subfield>
   <subfield code="b">XK010053</subfield>
   <subfield code="c">XK010000</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="900" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Metadata rights reserved</subfield>
   <subfield code="b">Springer special CC-BY-NC licence</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="908" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="D">1</subfield>
   <subfield code="a">research-article</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">jats</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="949" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="F">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="b">NL-springer</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">856</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">40</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0865-z</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">text/html</subfield>
   <subfield code="z">Onlinezugriff via DOI</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">700</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">1-</subfield>
   <subfield code="a">Qin</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Cheng-Zhong</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">Department of Economics, University of California, 93106, Santa Barbara, CA, USA</subfield>
   <subfield code="4">aut</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">700</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">1-</subfield>
   <subfield code="a">Shi</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Shuzhong</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">Guanghua School of Management, Peking University, Beijing, China</subfield>
   <subfield code="4">aut</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">700</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">1-</subfield>
   <subfield code="a">Tan</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Guofu</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">Department of Economics, University of Southern California, 90089-0253, Los Angeles, CA, USA</subfield>
   <subfield code="4">aut</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">773</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">0-</subfield>
   <subfield code="t">Economic Theory</subfield>
   <subfield code="d">Springer Berlin Heidelberg</subfield>
   <subfield code="g">58/3(2015-04-01), 413-440</subfield>
   <subfield code="x">0938-2259</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">58:3&lt;413</subfield>
   <subfield code="1">2015</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">58</subfield>
   <subfield code="o">199</subfield>
  </datafield>
 </record>
</collection>
