Revealed reputations in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
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| 024 | 7 | 0 | |a 10.1007/s00199-015-0863-1 |2 doi |
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| 245 | 0 | 0 | |a Revealed reputations in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma |h [Elektronische Daten] |c [Caleb Cox, Matthew Jones, Kevin Pflum, Paul Healy] |
| 520 | 3 | |a In a sequential-move, finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma game (FRPD), cooperation can be sustained if the first-mover believes her opponent might be a behavioral type who plays a tit-for-tat strategy in every period. We test this theory by revealing second-mover histories from an earlier FRPD experiment to their current opponent. Despite eliminating the possibility of reputation-building, aggregate cooperation actually increases when histories are revealed. Cooperative histories lead to increased trust, but negative histories do not cause decreased trust. We develop a behavioral model to explain these findings. | |
| 540 | |a Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2015 | ||
| 690 | 7 | |a Prisoners' dilemma |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Finitely repeated games |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Cooperation |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Reputation-building |2 nationallicence | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Cox |D Caleb |u Durham University Business School, Mill Hill Lane, DH1 3LB, Durham, UK |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Jones |D Matthew |u Federal Trade Commission, 600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Mail Drop HQ-238, 20580, Washington, DC, USA |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Pflum |D Kevin |u University of Alabama, Box 870224, 35487, Tuscaloosa, AL, USA |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Healy |D Paul |u The Ohio State University, 1945 North High Street, 43210, Columbus, OH, USA |4 aut | |
| 773 | 0 | |t Economic Theory |d Springer Berlin Heidelberg |g 58/3(2015-04-01), 441-484 |x 0938-2259 |q 58:3<441 |1 2015 |2 58 |o 199 | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0863-1 |q text/html |z Onlinezugriff via DOI |
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| 900 | 7 | |a Metadata rights reserved |b Springer special CC-BY-NC licence |2 nationallicence | |
| 908 | |D 1 |a research-article |2 jats | ||
| 949 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |F NATIONALLICENCE |b NL-springer | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 856 |E 40 |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0863-1 |q text/html |z Onlinezugriff via DOI | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 700 |E 1- |a Cox |D Caleb |u Durham University Business School, Mill Hill Lane, DH1 3LB, Durham, UK |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 700 |E 1- |a Jones |D Matthew |u Federal Trade Commission, 600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Mail Drop HQ-238, 20580, Washington, DC, USA |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 700 |E 1- |a Pflum |D Kevin |u University of Alabama, Box 870224, 35487, Tuscaloosa, AL, USA |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 700 |E 1- |a Healy |D Paul |u The Ohio State University, 1945 North High Street, 43210, Columbus, OH, USA |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 773 |E 0- |t Economic Theory |d Springer Berlin Heidelberg |g 58/3(2015-04-01), 441-484 |x 0938-2259 |q 58:3<441 |1 2015 |2 58 |o 199 | ||