caa a22 4500 605475660 CHVBK 20210128100353.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20150401xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s00199-014-0831-1 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00199-014-0831-1 Information transmission in nested sender-receiver games [Elektronische Daten] [Ying Chen, Sidartha Gordon] We introduce a "nestedness” relation for a general class of sender-receiver games and compare equilibrium properties, in particular the amount of information transmitted, across games that are nested. Roughly, game $$B$$ B is nested in game $$A$$ A if the players' optimal actions are closer in game $$B$$ B . We show that under some conditions, more information is transmitted in the nested game in the sense that the receiver's expected equilibrium payoff is higher. The results generalize the comparative statics and welfare comparisons with respect to preferences in the seminal paper of Crawford and Sobel (Econometrica 50(6):1431-1452, 1982). We also derive new results with respect to changes in priors in addition to changes in preferences. We illustrate the usefulness of the results in three applications: (i) delegation to an intermediary with a different prior, (ii) the choice between centralization and delegation, and (iii) two-way communication with an informed principal. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2014 Sender-receiver games nationallicence Information transmission nationallicence Nestedness nationallicence Intermediary nationallicence Delegation nationallicence Informed principal nationallicence Chen Ying Department of Economics, Johns Hopkins University, 3400 N. Charles St, 21218, Baltimore, MD, USA aut Gordon Sidartha Department of Economics, Sciences Po, 28 rue des Saints-Pères, 75007, Paris, France aut Economic Theory Springer Berlin Heidelberg 58/3(2015-04-01), 543-569 0938-2259 58:3<543 2015 58 199 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0831-1 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0831-1 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Chen Ying Department of Economics, Johns Hopkins University, 3400 N. Charles St, 21218, Baltimore, MD, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Gordon Sidartha Department of Economics, Sciences Po, 28 rue des Saints-Pères, 75007, Paris, France aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Economic Theory Springer Berlin Heidelberg 58/3(2015-04-01), 543-569 0938-2259 58:3<543 2015 58 199