A Folk theorem for stochastic games with finite horizon

Verfasser / Beitragende:
[Chantal Marlats]
Ort, Verlag, Jahr:
2015
Enthalten in:
Economic Theory, 58/3(2015-04-01), 485-507
Format:
Artikel (online)
ID: 605475679
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024 7 0 |a 10.1007/s00199-015-0862-2  |2 doi 
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100 1 |a Marlats  |D Chantal  |u LEMMA, University Panthéon-Assas (Paris 2), 4 rue Blaise Desgoffes, 75006, Paris, France  |4 aut 
245 1 2 |a A Folk theorem for stochastic games with finite horizon  |h [Elektronische Daten]  |c [Chantal Marlats] 
520 3 |a This paper provides assumptions for a limit Folk theorem in stochastic games with finite horizon. In addition to the asymptotic assumptions à la Dutta (J Econ Theory 66:1-32, 1995) I present an additional assumption under which the Folk theorem holds in stochastic games when the horizon is long but finite. This assumption says that the limit set of SPE payoffs contains a state invariant payoff vector $$w$$ w and, for each player $$i$$ i , another payoff vector that gives less than $$w$$ w to $$i$$ i . I present two alternative assumptions, one on a finite truncation of the stochastic game and the other on stage games and on the transition function, that imply this assumption. 
540 |a Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2015 
690 7 |a Folk theorem  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Stochastic games  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Cooperation  |2 nationallicence 
773 0 |t Economic Theory  |d Springer Berlin Heidelberg  |g 58/3(2015-04-01), 485-507  |x 0938-2259  |q 58:3<485  |1 2015  |2 58  |o 199 
856 4 0 |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0862-2  |q text/html  |z Onlinezugriff via DOI 
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900 7 |a Metadata rights reserved  |b Springer special CC-BY-NC licence  |2 nationallicence 
908 |D 1  |a research-article  |2 jats 
949 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |F NATIONALLICENCE  |b NL-springer 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 856  |E 40  |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0862-2  |q text/html  |z Onlinezugriff via DOI 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 100  |E 1-  |a Marlats  |D Chantal  |u LEMMA, University Panthéon-Assas (Paris 2), 4 rue Blaise Desgoffes, 75006, Paris, France  |4 aut 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 773  |E 0-  |t Economic Theory  |d Springer Berlin Heidelberg  |g 58/3(2015-04-01), 485-507  |x 0938-2259  |q 58:3<485  |1 2015  |2 58  |o 199