caa a22 4500 605475679 CHVBK 20210128100353.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20150401xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s00199-015-0862-2 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00199-015-0862-2 Marlats Chantal LEMMA, University Panthéon-Assas (Paris 2), 4 rue Blaise Desgoffes, 75006, Paris, France aut A Folk theorem for stochastic games with finite horizon [Elektronische Daten] [Chantal Marlats] This paper provides assumptions for a limit Folk theorem in stochastic games with finite horizon. In addition to the asymptotic assumptions à la Dutta (J Econ Theory 66:1-32, 1995) I present an additional assumption under which the Folk theorem holds in stochastic games when the horizon is long but finite. This assumption says that the limit set of SPE payoffs contains a state invariant payoff vector $$w$$ w and, for each player $$i$$ i , another payoff vector that gives less than $$w$$ w to $$i$$ i . I present two alternative assumptions, one on a finite truncation of the stochastic game and the other on stage games and on the transition function, that imply this assumption. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2015 Folk theorem nationallicence Stochastic games nationallicence Cooperation nationallicence Economic Theory Springer Berlin Heidelberg 58/3(2015-04-01), 485-507 0938-2259 58:3<485 2015 58 199 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0862-2 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0862-2 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Marlats Chantal LEMMA, University Panthéon-Assas (Paris 2), 4 rue Blaise Desgoffes, 75006, Paris, France aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Economic Theory Springer Berlin Heidelberg 58/3(2015-04-01), 485-507 0938-2259 58:3<485 2015 58 199