Bayesian general equilibrium

Verfasser / Beitragende:
[Alexis Toda]
Ort, Verlag, Jahr:
2015
Enthalten in:
Economic Theory, 58/2(2015-02-01), 375-411
Format:
Artikel (online)
ID: 605475717
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024 7 0 |a 10.1007/s00199-014-0849-4  |2 doi 
035 |a (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00199-014-0849-4 
100 1 |a Toda  |D Alexis  |u Department of Economics, University of California San Diego, 9500 Gilman Dr, 92093, La Jolla, CA, USA  |4 aut 
245 1 0 |a Bayesian general equilibrium  |h [Elektronische Daten]  |c [Alexis Toda] 
520 3 |a I introduce a general equilibrium model of non-optimizing agents that respond to aggregate variables (prices and the average demand profile of agent types) by putting a "prior” on their demand. An interim equilibrium is defined by the posterior demand distribution of agent types conditional on market clearing. A Bayesian general equilibrium (BGE) is an interim equilibrium such that aggregate variables are correctly anticipated. Under weak conditions, I prove the existence and the informational efficiency of BGE. I discuss the conditions under which the set of Bayesian and Walrasian equilibria coincide and show that the Walrasian equilibrium arises from a large class of non-optimizing behavior. 
540 |a Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2014 
690 7 |a Bayes rule  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Distribution  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Kullback-Leibler information  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Maximum entropy  |2 nationallicence 
773 0 |t Economic Theory  |d Springer Berlin Heidelberg  |g 58/2(2015-02-01), 375-411  |x 0938-2259  |q 58:2<375  |1 2015  |2 58  |o 199 
856 4 0 |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0849-4  |q text/html  |z Onlinezugriff via DOI 
898 |a BK010053  |b XK010053  |c XK010000 
900 7 |a Metadata rights reserved  |b Springer special CC-BY-NC licence  |2 nationallicence 
908 |D 1  |a research-article  |2 jats 
949 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |F NATIONALLICENCE  |b NL-springer 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 856  |E 40  |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0849-4  |q text/html  |z Onlinezugriff via DOI 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 100  |E 1-  |a Toda  |D Alexis  |u Department of Economics, University of California San Diego, 9500 Gilman Dr, 92093, La Jolla, CA, USA  |4 aut 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 773  |E 0-  |t Economic Theory  |d Springer Berlin Heidelberg  |g 58/2(2015-02-01), 375-411  |x 0938-2259  |q 58:2<375  |1 2015  |2 58  |o 199