Incentive contracts under product market competition and R&D spillovers
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| 024 | 7 | 0 | |a 10.1007/s00199-014-0811-5 |2 doi |
| 035 | |a (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00199-014-0811-5 | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Chalioti |D Evangelia |u Department of Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL, USA |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Incentive contracts under product market competition and R&D spillovers |h [Elektronische Daten] |c [Evangelia Chalioti] |
| 520 | 3 | |a This paper studies cost-reducing R&D incentives in a principal-agent model with product market competition. It argues that moral hazard does not necessarily decrease firms' profits in this setting. In highly competitive industries, firms are driven by business-stealing incentives and exert such high levels of R&D that they burn up their profits. In the presence of moral hazard, underprovision of R&D incentives due to risk sharing can generate considerable cost savings, implying higher profits for both rivals. This result indicates firms' incentives to adopt collusive-like behavior in the R&D market. We also examine the agents' contracts and the profits-risk relationship when cross-firm R&D spillovers occur. | |
| 540 | |a Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2014 | ||
| 690 | 7 | |a Moral hazard |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Process innovation |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Cournot competition |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a R&D spillovers |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Relative performance |2 nationallicence | |
| 773 | 0 | |t Economic Theory |d Springer Berlin Heidelberg |g 58/2(2015-02-01), 305-328 |x 0938-2259 |q 58:2<305 |1 2015 |2 58 |o 199 | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0811-5 |q text/html |z Onlinezugriff via DOI |
| 898 | |a BK010053 |b XK010053 |c XK010000 | ||
| 900 | 7 | |a Metadata rights reserved |b Springer special CC-BY-NC licence |2 nationallicence | |
| 908 | |D 1 |a research-article |2 jats | ||
| 949 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |F NATIONALLICENCE |b NL-springer | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 856 |E 40 |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0811-5 |q text/html |z Onlinezugriff via DOI | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 100 |E 1- |a Chalioti |D Evangelia |u Department of Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL, USA |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 773 |E 0- |t Economic Theory |d Springer Berlin Heidelberg |g 58/2(2015-02-01), 305-328 |x 0938-2259 |q 58:2<305 |1 2015 |2 58 |o 199 | ||