caa a22 4500 605475741 CHVBK 20210128100353.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20150201xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s00199-014-0811-5 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00199-014-0811-5 Chalioti Evangelia Department of Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL, USA aut Incentive contracts under product market competition and R&D spillovers [Elektronische Daten] [Evangelia Chalioti] This paper studies cost-reducing R&D incentives in a principal-agent model with product market competition. It argues that moral hazard does not necessarily decrease firms' profits in this setting. In highly competitive industries, firms are driven by business-stealing incentives and exert such high levels of R&D that they burn up their profits. In the presence of moral hazard, underprovision of R&D incentives due to risk sharing can generate considerable cost savings, implying higher profits for both rivals. This result indicates firms' incentives to adopt collusive-like behavior in the R&D market. We also examine the agents' contracts and the profits-risk relationship when cross-firm R&D spillovers occur. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2014 Moral hazard nationallicence Process innovation nationallicence Cournot competition nationallicence R&D spillovers nationallicence Relative performance nationallicence Economic Theory Springer Berlin Heidelberg 58/2(2015-02-01), 305-328 0938-2259 58:2<305 2015 58 199 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0811-5 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0811-5 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Chalioti Evangelia Department of Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Economic Theory Springer Berlin Heidelberg 58/2(2015-02-01), 305-328 0938-2259 58:2<305 2015 58 199