Learning and collusion in new markets with uncertain entry costs
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| 024 | 7 | 0 | |a 10.1007/s00199-014-0814-2 |2 doi |
| 035 | |a (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00199-014-0814-2 | ||
| 245 | 0 | 0 | |a Learning and collusion in new markets with uncertain entry costs |h [Elektronische Daten] |c [Francis Bloch, Simona Fabrizi, Steffen Lippert] |
| 520 | 3 | |a This paper analyzes an entry timing game with uncertain entry costs. Two firms receive costless signals about the cost of a new project and decide when to invest. We characterize the equilibrium of the investment timing game with private and public signals. We show that competition leads the two firms to invest too early and analyze two collusion schemes, one in which one firm pays the other to stay out of the market and one in which this buyout is mediated by a third party. We characterize conditions under which the efficient outcome can be implemented in both collusion schemes. | |
| 540 | |a Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2014 | ||
| 690 | 7 | |a Learning |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Preemption |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a New markets |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Project selection |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Collusion |2 nationallicence | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Bloch |D Francis |u Paris School of Economics, Université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne, 106-112 Boulevard de l'Hôpital, 75647, Paris Cedex 13, France |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Fabrizi |D Simona |u School of Economics and Finance (Albany), Massey University, NSMC, PB 102904, 0745, Auckland, New Zealand |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Lippert |D Steffen |u Centre for Mathematical Social Science, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand |4 aut | |
| 773 | 0 | |t Economic Theory |d Springer Berlin Heidelberg |g 58/2(2015-02-01), 273-303 |x 0938-2259 |q 58:2<273 |1 2015 |2 58 |o 199 | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0814-2 |q text/html |z Onlinezugriff via DOI |
| 898 | |a BK010053 |b XK010053 |c XK010000 | ||
| 900 | 7 | |a Metadata rights reserved |b Springer special CC-BY-NC licence |2 nationallicence | |
| 908 | |D 1 |a research-article |2 jats | ||
| 949 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |F NATIONALLICENCE |b NL-springer | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 856 |E 40 |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0814-2 |q text/html |z Onlinezugriff via DOI | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 700 |E 1- |a Bloch |D Francis |u Paris School of Economics, Université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne, 106-112 Boulevard de l'Hôpital, 75647, Paris Cedex 13, France |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 700 |E 1- |a Fabrizi |D Simona |u School of Economics and Finance (Albany), Massey University, NSMC, PB 102904, 0745, Auckland, New Zealand |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 700 |E 1- |a Lippert |D Steffen |u Centre for Mathematical Social Science, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 773 |E 0- |t Economic Theory |d Springer Berlin Heidelberg |g 58/2(2015-02-01), 273-303 |x 0938-2259 |q 58:2<273 |1 2015 |2 58 |o 199 | ||