caa a22 4500 60547575X CHVBK 20210128100353.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20150201xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s00199-014-0814-2 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00199-014-0814-2 Learning and collusion in new markets with uncertain entry costs [Elektronische Daten] [Francis Bloch, Simona Fabrizi, Steffen Lippert] This paper analyzes an entry timing game with uncertain entry costs. Two firms receive costless signals about the cost of a new project and decide when to invest. We characterize the equilibrium of the investment timing game with private and public signals. We show that competition leads the two firms to invest too early and analyze two collusion schemes, one in which one firm pays the other to stay out of the market and one in which this buyout is mediated by a third party. We characterize conditions under which the efficient outcome can be implemented in both collusion schemes. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2014 Learning nationallicence Preemption nationallicence New markets nationallicence Project selection nationallicence Collusion nationallicence Bloch Francis Paris School of Economics, Université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne, 106-112 Boulevard de l'Hôpital, 75647, Paris Cedex 13, France aut Fabrizi Simona School of Economics and Finance (Albany), Massey University, NSMC, PB 102904, 0745, Auckland, New Zealand aut Lippert Steffen Centre for Mathematical Social Science, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand aut Economic Theory Springer Berlin Heidelberg 58/2(2015-02-01), 273-303 0938-2259 58:2<273 2015 58 199 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0814-2 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0814-2 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Bloch Francis Paris School of Economics, Université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne, 106-112 Boulevard de l'Hôpital, 75647, Paris Cedex 13, France aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Fabrizi Simona School of Economics and Finance (Albany), Massey University, NSMC, PB 102904, 0745, Auckland, New Zealand aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Lippert Steffen Centre for Mathematical Social Science, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Economic Theory Springer Berlin Heidelberg 58/2(2015-02-01), 273-303 0938-2259 58:2<273 2015 58 199