caa a22 4500 605475806 CHVBK 20210128100353.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20150501xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s00199-014-0813-3 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00199-014-0813-3 Revealed preference theory for finite choice sets [Elektronische Daten] [Sam Cosaert, Thomas Demuynck] The theory of revealed preferences offers an elegant way to test the neoclassical model of utility maximization subject to a linear budget constraint. In many settings, however, the set of available consumption bundles does not take the form of a linear budget set. In this paper, we adjust the theory of revealed preferences to handle situations where the set of feasible bundles is finite. Such situations occur frequently in many real life and experimental settings. We derive the revealed preference conditions for consistency with utility maximization in this finite choice set setting. Interestingly, we find that it is necessary to make a distinction between the cases where the underlying utility function is weakly monotone, strongly monotone and/or concave. Next, we provide conditions on the structure of the finite choice sets for which the usual revealed preference condition (i.e. GARP) is still valid. We illustrate the relevance of our results by means of an illustration based on two experimental data sets that contain choice behaviour from children and young adults. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2014 Revealed preferences nationallicence Finite choice sets nationallicence Experimental economics nationallicence Cosaert Sam Center for Economic Studies, University of Leuven, E. Sabbelaan 53, 8500, Kortrijk, Belgium aut Demuynck Thomas Maastricht University, Tongersestraat 53, Maastricht, The Netherlands aut Economic Theory Springer Berlin Heidelberg 59/1(2015-05-01), 169-200 0938-2259 59:1<169 2015 59 199 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0813-3 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0813-3 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Cosaert Sam Center for Economic Studies, University of Leuven, E. Sabbelaan 53, 8500, Kortrijk, Belgium aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Demuynck Thomas Maastricht University, Tongersestraat 53, Maastricht, The Netherlands aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Economic Theory Springer Berlin Heidelberg 59/1(2015-05-01), 169-200 0938-2259 59:1<169 2015 59 199