Differential information in large games with strategic complementarities
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| 024 | 7 | 0 | |a 10.1007/s00199-014-0827-x |2 doi |
| 035 | |a (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00199-014-0827-x | ||
| 245 | 0 | 0 | |a Differential information in large games with strategic complementarities |h [Elektronische Daten] |c [Łukasz Balbus, Paweł Dziewulski, Kevin Reffett, Łukasz Woźny] |
| 520 | 3 | |a We study equilibrium in large games of strategic complementarities (GSC) with differential information. We define an appropriate notion of distributional Bayesian Nash equilibrium and prove its existence. Furthermore, we characterize order-theoretic properties of the equilibrium set, provide monotone comparative statics for ordered perturbations of the space of games, and provide explicit algorithms for computing extremal equilibria. We complement the paper with new results on the existence of Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the sense of Balder and Rustichini (J Econ Theory 62(2):385-393, 1994) or Kim and Yannelis (J Econ Theory 77(2):330-353, 1997) for large GSC and provide an analogous characterization of the equilibrium set as in the case of distributional Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Finally, we apply our results to riot games, beauty contests, and common value auctions. In all cases, standard existence and comparative statics tools in the theory of supermodular games for finite numbers of agents do not apply in general, and new constructions are required. | |
| 540 | |a The Author(s), 2014 | ||
| 690 | 7 | |a Large games |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Differential information |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Distributional equilibria |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Supermodular games |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Aggregating the single-crossing property |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Computation |2 nationallicence | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Balbus |D Łukasz |u Faculty of Mathematics, Computer Sciences and Econometrics, University of Zielona Góra, Zielona Gora, Poland |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Dziewulski |D Paweł |u Department of Economics, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Reffett |D Kevin |u Department of Economics, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Woźny |D Łukasz |u Department of Quantitative Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, al. Niepodległości 162, 02-554, Warszawa, Poland |4 aut | |
| 773 | 0 | |t Economic Theory |d Springer Berlin Heidelberg |g 59/1(2015-05-01), 201-243 |x 0938-2259 |q 59:1<201 |1 2015 |2 59 |o 199 | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0827-x |q text/html |z Onlinezugriff via DOI |
| 898 | |a BK010053 |b XK010053 |c XK010000 | ||
| 900 | 7 | |a Metadata rights reserved |b Springer special CC-BY-NC licence |2 nationallicence | |
| 908 | |D 1 |a research-article |2 jats | ||
| 949 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |F NATIONALLICENCE |b NL-springer | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 856 |E 40 |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0827-x |q text/html |z Onlinezugriff via DOI | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 700 |E 1- |a Balbus |D Łukasz |u Faculty of Mathematics, Computer Sciences and Econometrics, University of Zielona Góra, Zielona Gora, Poland |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 700 |E 1- |a Dziewulski |D Paweł |u Department of Economics, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 700 |E 1- |a Reffett |D Kevin |u Department of Economics, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 700 |E 1- |a Woźny |D Łukasz |u Department of Quantitative Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, al. Niepodległości 162, 02-554, Warszawa, Poland |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 773 |E 0- |t Economic Theory |d Springer Berlin Heidelberg |g 59/1(2015-05-01), 201-243 |x 0938-2259 |q 59:1<201 |1 2015 |2 59 |o 199 | ||