caa a22 4500 605475814 CHVBK 20210128100353.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20150501xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s00199-014-0827-x doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00199-014-0827-x Differential information in large games with strategic complementarities [Elektronische Daten] [Łukasz Balbus, Paweł Dziewulski, Kevin Reffett, Łukasz Woźny] We study equilibrium in large games of strategic complementarities (GSC) with differential information. We define an appropriate notion of distributional Bayesian Nash equilibrium and prove its existence. Furthermore, we characterize order-theoretic properties of the equilibrium set, provide monotone comparative statics for ordered perturbations of the space of games, and provide explicit algorithms for computing extremal equilibria. We complement the paper with new results on the existence of Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the sense of Balder and Rustichini (J Econ Theory 62(2):385-393, 1994) or Kim and Yannelis (J Econ Theory 77(2):330-353, 1997) for large GSC and provide an analogous characterization of the equilibrium set as in the case of distributional Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Finally, we apply our results to riot games, beauty contests, and common value auctions. In all cases, standard existence and comparative statics tools in the theory of supermodular games for finite numbers of agents do not apply in general, and new constructions are required. The Author(s), 2014 Large games nationallicence Differential information nationallicence Distributional equilibria nationallicence Supermodular games nationallicence Aggregating the single-crossing property nationallicence Computation nationallicence Balbus Łukasz Faculty of Mathematics, Computer Sciences and Econometrics, University of Zielona Góra, Zielona Gora, Poland aut Dziewulski Paweł Department of Economics, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK aut Reffett Kevin Department of Economics, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA aut Woźny Łukasz Department of Quantitative Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, al. Niepodległości 162, 02-554, Warszawa, Poland aut Economic Theory Springer Berlin Heidelberg 59/1(2015-05-01), 201-243 0938-2259 59:1<201 2015 59 199 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0827-x text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0827-x text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Balbus Łukasz Faculty of Mathematics, Computer Sciences and Econometrics, University of Zielona Góra, Zielona Gora, Poland aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Dziewulski Paweł Department of Economics, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Reffett Kevin Department of Economics, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Woźny Łukasz Department of Quantitative Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, al. Niepodległości 162, 02-554, Warszawa, Poland aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Economic Theory Springer Berlin Heidelberg 59/1(2015-05-01), 201-243 0938-2259 59:1<201 2015 59 199