<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim">
 <record>
  <leader>     caa a22        4500</leader>
  <controlfield tag="001">605475830</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="003">CHVBK</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="005">20210128100353.0</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="007">cr unu---uuuuu</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="008">210128e20150501xx      s     000 0 eng  </controlfield>
  <datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2="0">
   <subfield code="a">10.1007/s00199-014-0812-4</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">doi</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">(NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00199-014-0812-4</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="245" ind1="0" ind2="0">
   <subfield code="a">Value allocation under ambiguity</subfield>
   <subfield code="h">[Elektronische Daten]</subfield>
   <subfield code="c">[Angelos Angelopoulos, Leonidas Koutsougeras]</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">We consider a pure exchange economy with asymmetric information where individual behavior exhibits ambiguity aversion along the line of maximin expected utility decision making. For such economies, we introduce different notions of maximin value allocations. We also introduce a strong notion of incentive compatibility. We prove the existence and incentive compatibility of the maximin value allocation. We conclude that unlike the Bayesian value allocation approach in Krasa Yannelis (Econometrica 62(4):881-900, 1994), incentive compatibility is related to efficiency rather than to direct exchange of information.</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="540" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2014</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Asymmetric information</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Maxmin value allocation</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Incentive compatibility</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Efficiency</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Angelopoulos</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Angelos</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">School of Social Sciences, Economics, University of Manchester, Oxford Road, M13 9PL, Manchester, UK</subfield>
   <subfield code="4">aut</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Koutsougeras</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Leonidas</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">School of Social Sciences, Economics, University of Manchester, Oxford Road, M13 9PL, Manchester, UK</subfield>
   <subfield code="4">aut</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="t">Economic Theory</subfield>
   <subfield code="d">Springer Berlin Heidelberg</subfield>
   <subfield code="g">59/1(2015-05-01), 147-167</subfield>
   <subfield code="x">0938-2259</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">59:1&lt;147</subfield>
   <subfield code="1">2015</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">59</subfield>
   <subfield code="o">199</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0">
   <subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0812-4</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">text/html</subfield>
   <subfield code="z">Onlinezugriff via DOI</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="898" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">BK010053</subfield>
   <subfield code="b">XK010053</subfield>
   <subfield code="c">XK010000</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="900" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Metadata rights reserved</subfield>
   <subfield code="b">Springer special CC-BY-NC licence</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="908" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="D">1</subfield>
   <subfield code="a">research-article</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">jats</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="949" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="F">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="b">NL-springer</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">856</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">40</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0812-4</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">text/html</subfield>
   <subfield code="z">Onlinezugriff via DOI</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">700</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">1-</subfield>
   <subfield code="a">Angelopoulos</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Angelos</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">School of Social Sciences, Economics, University of Manchester, Oxford Road, M13 9PL, Manchester, UK</subfield>
   <subfield code="4">aut</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">700</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">1-</subfield>
   <subfield code="a">Koutsougeras</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Leonidas</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">School of Social Sciences, Economics, University of Manchester, Oxford Road, M13 9PL, Manchester, UK</subfield>
   <subfield code="4">aut</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">773</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">0-</subfield>
   <subfield code="t">Economic Theory</subfield>
   <subfield code="d">Springer Berlin Heidelberg</subfield>
   <subfield code="g">59/1(2015-05-01), 147-167</subfield>
   <subfield code="x">0938-2259</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">59:1&lt;147</subfield>
   <subfield code="1">2015</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">59</subfield>
   <subfield code="o">199</subfield>
  </datafield>
 </record>
</collection>
